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The Failure of Economic Interpretations of 
the Law of Contract Damages 
Nathan B. Oman* 
Abstract 
The law of contracts is complex but remarkably stable. What we lack is a 
widely accepted interpretation of that law as embodying a coherent set of 
normative choices. Some scholars have suggested that either economic 
efficiency or personal autonomy provide unifying principles of contract law. 
These two approaches, however, seem incommensurable, which suggests that 
we must reject at least one of them in order to have a coherent theory. This 
Article dissents from this view and has a simple thesis: Economic accounts of 
the current doctrine governing contract damages have failed, but efficiency 
arguments remain key to any adequate theory of contract law. Contractual 
liability-like virtually all civil liability-is structured around the concept of 
bilateralism, meaning that damages are always paid by defeated defendants to 
victorious plaintiffs. Ultimately, economic accounts of this basic feature are 
unpersuasive. This criticism, however, leaves untouched many of the key 
economic insights into the doctrine of contract damages. The limited failure of 
economic interpretations points toward a principled accommodation of both 
autonomy and efficiency in a single vision of contract law where notions of 
autonomy provide the basic structure and economics fills in most of the 
doctrinal detail. 
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I. Introduction 
The law of contracts is a complex but remarkably stable field. To be sure, 
new factual situations provide novel challenges for old doctrines, and the 
interstitial development of the law continues. 1 Still, there is widespread 
agreement about the doctrinal shape of modem contract law. 2 What we lack is 
1. See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997) 
(considering the enforceability of contractual terms contained "in the box" of a Gateway 2000 
System); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1448-49 (7th Cir. 1996) (considering the 
enforceability of shrink-wrap license agreements); Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 
939 F.2d 91,97-98 (3d Cir. 1991) (considering the enforcement of a box-top software license). 
2. See JAMES GoRDLEY, PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE 1 
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a widely accepted interpretation of that law. We have historical narratives of 
how the law developed and innumerable suggestions for how it should be 
reformed. 3 What this work does not offer is an interpretation of current 
contract law as embodying a coherent set of normative choices. Indeed, much 
of the scholarly discussion of contract law implicitly or explicitly assumes that 
any such interpretation is impossible and that the law we have represents, at 
best, a collection of essentially random and disconnected choices resulting from 
a series of historical accidents.4 One of the central questions facing students of 
contract law is whether this theoretically pessimistic view of the law is correct, 
or whether it is possible to understand it as a coherent normative system. 5 
One of the most promising contenders for the role of a unified theory of 
contract law is economics. On this view, contract law as we have it represents a 
choice to promote efficiency, and the particular rules we find in contract 
doctrine are best seen as creating economically optimal incentives for 
contracting parties.6 The dominant alternative is that contract law is about 
advancing the liberal ideal of personal autonomy by giving legal effect to the 
private decisions of contracting parties. 7 The apparent success of economics as 
a methodology comes from the fact that, unlike autonomy, it seems to provide 
concepts that generate conclusions that are fine-grained enough to account for 
contract law doctrine. 8 The duty to keep one's promises may be a normatively 
(1991) ("Both 'common law' systems ... and 'civil law systems' ... have a similar doctrinal 
system based on similar legal concepts."). 
3. See generally D.J. IBBETSON, A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF 
OBLIGATIONS (1999) (explaining how the common law of obligations developed and suggesting 
ways to increase continuity within the area oflaw). 
4. See, e.g., id. at v ("[Legal ideas] are indeterminate and flexible, always at least 
potentially in a state of flux."). 
5. See, e.g., Brian H. Bix, Contract Law Theory 35 (Univ. Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 06-12, 2006), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=892783 ("Skepticism 
about the tenability of a single unified theory of contract law is hardly new. However, given the 
number of prominent theorists who propose or defend general theories of contract law, it is an 
issue worth revisiting."). 
6. See generally Richard Craswell, Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises, in 
THE THEORY OF CONTRACT LAW: NEW ESSAYS 19, 26-32 (2001) (arguing that economic 
analysis sees contract law as being about which rules created the optimal incentives for 
contracting parties). 
7. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE ( 1981) (presenting an autonomy 
position). 
8. See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 
88 MICH. L. REv. 489, 503-16 (1989) (discussing why certain contract rules cannot be derived 
from philosophical theories based on individual liberty). 
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attractive ideal, but it lacks the conceptual power to specify most of the rules of 
contract law.9 
Notwithstanding this sunny assessment of economic theories of contract, 
criticism remains very much alive. Partisans of autonomy theories have 
stubbornly insisted that efficiency is such a morally bankrupt ideal that 
economic theories of contract must be rejected, while others have attacked 
efficiency theories on economic grounds. 10 Navigating a route through these 
competing claims is one of the central tasks for the philosophy of contract law. 
Some have suggested that rather than seeking a jurisprudential silver bullet that 
will allow us to reject either autonomy or efficiency once and for all, 
philosophers of contract law should turn their energies to a theory that provides 
a principled accommodation of both approaches in a single vision of contract 
law. 11 This Article is part of that project. It has a simple thesis: Economic 
accounts of the current doctrine governing contract damages have failed, and 
the nature of that failure places limits on the role of economics in an integrated 
theory of contract law. 
Economic theories of contract law are offered as-among other things-
an explanation of contract doctrine as we have it. 12 They purport to show to us 
the underlying normative logic of the law. When it comes to contract damages, 
however, the economic explanation ultimately falls short of success because it 
9. The hope that the two approaches would converge on the same outcomes has been 
largely rejected as implausible in a world of transaction costs. See MlcHAELJ. TREBILCOCK, THE 
LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 241-68 (1993) (arguing that the claim of convergence of 
autonomy and welfare values is tenuous). 
10. See STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 106-66 (2004) (summarizing normative 
critiques of efficiency theories of contract); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law 
After Three Decades: Success or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 864-68 (2003)( arguing that the 
economic analysis of contract law has failed because of ambiguities in transaction costs). But 
see Ian Ayers, Valuing Modern Contract Scholarship, 112 YALE L.J. 881, 881 (2003) 
(responding to Posner's arguments); Richard Craswell, In That Case, What is the Question? 
Economics and the Demands of Contract Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 903, 903 (2003) (same). 
11. See Jody S. Kraus, Legal Theory and Contract Law: Groundwork for the 
Reconciliation of Autonomy and Efficiency, 1 Soc. PoL. & LEGAL PHIL. 385, 389-90 (2002) 
(explaining how to reconcile apparently incompatible legal theories by distinguishing between 
their purpose, nature, object, and structure); Jody S. Kraus, Reconciling Autonomy and 
Efficiency in Contract Law: The Vertical Integration Strategy, in SociAL, PoLmcAL, AND 
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 420, 421 (Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva eds., 2001) ("[The vertical 
integration strategy] reconciles efficiency and autonomy contract theories by construing them as 
comprising logically distinct elements within one unified theory."); see also Nathan Oman, 
Corporations and Autonomy Theories of Contract: A Critique of the New Lex Mercatoria, 83 
DENV. U. L. REv. 101, 142-44 (2005) (discussing the use of the vertical integration strategy); 
Nathan Oman, Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1483, 1505--06 (2005) 
(same). 
12. See irifra Part II.B (presenting several economic accounts of contract law). 
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cannot account for the bilateralism of contractual liability, which then renders 
the dominant economic interpretation of damages fundamentally contradictory. 
Generally speaking, the remedy in contract law involves a transfer from a 
breaching party to an aggrieved party. The sum paid by the wayward promisor 
is exactly equal to the sum paid to the disappointed promisee. 13 For example, if 
Jack enters into a contract to fetch water for Jill in return for a fee and Jack then 
fails to deliver the water as promised, the law of contracts allows Jill to sue 
Jack for the value of his failed performance. If Jill is successful, the law will 
require Jack to deliver Jill money. The sum that he pays and she receives will 
be identical. The law does not provide that Jack pays a fine to some third party 
(like the state) for breaching his contract, nor does it provide Jill with 
government-funded contract insurance against breach by those with whom she 
enters into contracts. Rather, it provides a way for Jill to extract money from 
Jack. 14 This is what is meant by bilateralism. 
Bilateralism has been a much-discussed topic in the philosophy of tort 
law. 15 There, the argument has centered on the question of whether bilateralism 
signals a commitment on the part of the law to ex post rather than ex ante moral 
theories. 16 It has played a much smaller role in contract theory, although its 
appearance in that field has also been marked by a recapitulation of the 
supposed normative challenge that it poses to the efficiency norm. 17 My 
argument is different. I do not believe that bilateralism presents a problem for 
the idea of efficiency as a normative criterion per se. Ex post normative criteria 
provide one possible explanation of the bilateralism of contract law, but 
contrary to the claims made by some autonomy theorists, there is no reason to 
13. For ease of exposition, throughout this Article, I will refer to the breaching party as 
the "promisor" and the breachee as the "promisee." Of course, in actual contracts, the victim of 
breach can be a promisor as well. Also, for ease of exposition, I will assume that promisors are 
male and promisees are female, which ought to help readers identify the proper antecedents for 
the pronouns in the various hypotheticals below. 
14. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 623, 623 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds., 2002) 
(arguing that one of the key features of private law is that it gives plaintiffs the right to attack 
those that have harmed them). 
15. See, e.g., JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 234-51 {1992) (discussing the 
economic analysis of torts); JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE 13-24 (2001) 
(discussing bilateralism). 
16. See, e.g., ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THEIDEAOFPRIVATELAW 136{1995){"[L]iketortlaw, 
contract law is a regime of correlative right and duty."). 
17. See, e.g., SMITH, supra note 10, at 134 ("[D]efenders of efficiency must offer an 
explanation as to why legal reasoning appears largely unconcerned with efficiency."). 
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suppose that bilateralism commits the law to an ex post moral perspective. The 
challenge ofbilateralism turns out to be considerably less "meta."18 
Economic theorists have long recognized that specifying efficient contract 
damages is plagued by the problem of overreliance. 19 In a nutshell, damages 
that create efficient incentives for promisors will create inefficient incentives 
for promisees. The economic discussion of this paradox has generally bustled 
to the question of how one would design institutions to cope with the problem 
without pausing to consider what overreliance tells us about the role of 
economics in explaining the contract law that we have now. Seen from the 
perspective of the philosophy of contract law, however, overreliance is a result 
of bilateralism. Accordingly, economic theories of contract fail to explain 
current contract law, not because bilateralism per se commits one to an 
opposing value but because one simply cannot construct efficient incentives 
using a bilateral structure. Philosophically, bilateralism remains an 
unexplained mystery for economic explanations of contract law. 
This failure to account for bilateralism, however, leaves many of the 
insights of economics into the current law of contract damages untouched. It 
does, however, mean that economic arguments must be combined with some 
other set of theories if we are to have a complete and coherent account of 
contract doctrine. Autonomy theories of contract can account for the 
bilateralism of contract damages. They cannot, however, generate arguments 
one way or another in support of most of contract doctrine, including much of 
the doctrine that specifies remedies for breach. In short, the failure of 
economic explanations of contract damages demonstrates that both efficiency 
and autonomy theories need one another if we are to provide a coherent account 
of contemporary contract law. The apparent incommensurability of autonomy 
theories, which are essentially deontological, and efficiency theories, which are 
essentially consequentialist, can be managed by the fact that contract law 
provides a hierarchical arrangement of the two values in which autonomy 
specifies the basic structure of contract law and efficiency provides most of the 
doctrinal detail. 
The remainder of this Article is organized as follows. In Part IT, I discuss 
what we mean when we talk about explaining a body of law, laying the 
methodological groundwork for my critique of economic theories of the current 
law of contract damages. In Part Ill, I summarize the law of contract damages, 
providing the data that an explanatory theory must cope with. In Part IV, I lay 
18. See infra Part V.B (presenting bilateralism as an objection to economic explanations 
of contract damages). 
19. See infra Part V.B.l (describing efficient breach and the problem of overreliance). 
THE FAILURE OF ECONOMIC INTERPRETATIONS 835 
out the economic explanation of this doctrine. In Part V, I explain how the 
bilateralism of contractual liability undermines this explanation. In Part VI, I 
explain what the failure of economic theories of contract damages tells us about 
the project of explaining the law and the limits of economic analysis. 
II. Explaining the Law 
A. On the Variety of Legal Theories 
Legal theorists spend a great deal of time constructing arguments that 
purport to explain or illuminate the law, but they are not always as clear as one 
might wish on the precise nature of their philosophical ambitions.20 Broadly 
speaking, legal theories can be normative or descriptive. As we shall see, this 
distinction breaks down to a certain extent, as theories on both sides of this 
divide have descriptive and normative elements. 
To illustrate normative legal theories, consider the example of Jeremy 
Bentham.Z1 Bentham was convinced that he had found the master norm for 
social design. 22 Claiming to ask only what will produce the greatest happiness 
for the greatest number, he imagined what an ideal legal system would look 
like. 23 The result was a torrent of suggestions on the construction of every 
possible sort oflegal institution.24 In his work, Bentham was contemptuous of 
existing legal institutions. 25 He did not see their current form as providing any 
sort of criterion for theoretical success.26 To be sure, his project had a 
descriptive aspect to it. In criticizing existing institutions and making 
suggestions for their reform, it was necessary to identify and decide which of 
20. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Listeners and Eavesdroppers: Substantive Legal Theory 
and Its Audience, 63 U. CoLO. L. REv. 569 (1992) (explaining why legal theorists might be 
reluctant to share their philosophical ambitions with practitioners). 
21. See generally GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 
(1986) (discussing Bentham's voluminous criticisms of the common law). 
22. See Jeremy Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, in THE ENGLISH 
PIDLOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 791, 843 (Edwin A. Burtt ed., 1939) ("The general object 
which all laws have, or ought to have, in common, is to augment the total happiness of the 
community; and therefore, in the first place, to exclude, as far as may be, everything that tends 
to subtract from that happiness: in other words, to exclude mischief."). 
23. See id. at 791-92 (presenting the principle of unity as the ideal system's foundation). 
24. See POSTEMA, supra note 21, at 465 (presenting a bibliography of Bentham's legal 
and political writings). 
25. See Bentham, supra note 22, at 795 (stating "whatever principle differs from [the 
principles of utility] in any case must necessarily be a wrong one"). 
26. See id. at 795-99 (describing the principles adverse to that of utility). 
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his proposed alternatives should be substituted for which actually existing 
institution?7 In all of this, however, Bentham took the ability to maximize 
utility as the sole evidence of success. 28 
In contrast, a descriptive theory of the law takes the explanation of the law 
as it currently exists as its primary task. Hence, unlike normative theories, 
descriptive theories use the current shape of the law to generate criteria of 
theoretical success. H.L.A. Hart drew a distinction between what he called the 
internal and external view of law.29 The external approach to the law is 
essentially social scientific. 30 It views the law as a nexus of human behavior 
and seeks to explain it by reference to familiar explanatory concepts such as the 
rational actor model, the interaction of "ideal types," and other tools of the 
social sciences.31 An internal account oflaw seeks to capture the structure of 
the law from the point of view of a participant.32 On this view, the law is a 
social practice but one that cannot be reduced to the behavior of social actors. 
Rather it is a normative structure, and the task of the legal theorist is to explain 
the nature and meaning of this structure. 33 The internal approach shares with 
the external point of view a belief that theoretical success requires some sort of 
"fit" with the law as it exists but takes "law" to refer to a set of norms rather 
than a set of behaviors. It shares with normative theories a concern for 
justification, but rather than seeking the best possible legal system, it searches 
for the norms that structure the law that we actually have. 34 This Article is 
concerned solely with this internal and descriptive variety of legal theory. 
27. See id. at 800-02 (describing the four sanctions of pain or pleasure that should be 
used to fashion behavior). 
28. See id. at 800 ("It has been shown that the happiness of the individuals of whom a 
community is composed ... is the end."). 
29. See generally H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw ( 1994) (explaining the distinction 
between internal and external statements oflaw). 
30. See id. at 255 ("The external point of view of social rules is that of an observer of their 
practice."). 
31. See generally ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVES (DavidS. Clark ed., 2006) (discussing sociological approaches to law). 
32. See HART, supra note 29, at 255 ("[T]he internal point of view is that of a participant 
in [a] practice who accepts the rules as guides to conduct and as standards of criticism."). 
33. The analogy of games can illustrate the distinction. Ifl study chess by examining the 
behavior of chess players from a sociological or anthropological point of view, I am offering an 
external account. If I study chess by examining the rules of chess and chess tactics, I am 
offering an internal account. 
34. See COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 15, at 7 (presenting such a theory). 
Coleman states: 
[I]nterested in providing an explanation of our practices, or important parts of 
them, but explanations that make sense of the practice in light of the norms it 
claims are inherent in it, norms, moreover, that could withstand the test of rational 
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B. What Sort ofTheories are Economic Accounts of Contract Law? 
There can be little doubt that much of the economic theorizing on contract 
law is frankly normative. However, much of the attraction of economic 
theories of the law comes from their apparent ability to explain current 
structure. Richard Posner has written that "many areas of the law, 
especially ... the great common law fields ... bear the stamp of economic 
reasoning."35 Others have been even more enthusiastic; one lawyer-economist 
has gushed, "Contract law is best understood from the perspective oflaw-and-
economics, which is the touchstone of private law scholarship, a key that 
appears to unlock every door. "36 
Even if economics provides descriptive theories, however, one still might 
argue that it provides external rather than internal accounts of the law. On this 
view, the efficiency of contract law is understood as a social scientific claim. 37 
For example, some have offered evolutionary accounts of the common law 
whereby institutional incentives cause it to evolve toward efficiency. 38 
Alternatively, one might argue that efficiency is an instrumentalist explanation 
of judicial behavior. For example, Milton Friedman argued that economic 
theories do not depend on the truth of the rational actor model but only on 
whether the predictions generated by the model are empirically verified. 39 
/d. 
reflection. This sort of explanation focuses on the reason-giving or normative 
dimension of social practices. 
35. RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 25 (6th ed. 2003). 
36. FRANK H. BUCKLEY, JUST EXCHANGE: A THEORY OF CONTRACT xi (2005). 
37. See HART, supra note 29, at 255 (describing the external point of view as social 
scientific). 
38. See, e.g., Peter H. Aranson, Economic Efficiency and the Common Law: A Critical 
Survey, in LAW AND ECONOMICS AND THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL REGULATION 51, 51-84 (1986) 
(summarizing several evolutionary models that attempt to explain judicial behavior as efficient); 
Martin J. Bailey & Paul H. Rubin, A Positive Theory of Legal Change, 14 INT'L REv. L. & 
EcoN. 467, 472 (1994) ("[C]ommon law will tend to evolve toward favoring the type oflitigant 
that is less numerous with respect to a particular type of case."); Paul H. Rubin, Common Law 
and Statute Law, ll J. LEGAL STUD. 205, 211-22 (1982) (arguing that common law evolved 
toward efficiency in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when it was more costly to 
organize interest groups); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 
51, 51 ( 1977) (arguing that disputants are more likely to resort to in-court settlement where legal 
rules are inefficient, and thus inefficient rules evolve into rules from "the utility maximizing 
decisions of disputants rather than from the wisdom of judges"); Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and 
Fall of Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1551, 
1562-1632 (2003) (describing certain historical institutional developments and explaining how 
they provided a framework for the common law to evolve in favor of efficiency-enhancing 
rules). 
39. See ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 74-79 (1988) 
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Analogously, one could argue that regardless of what judges say or think, 
efficiency provides a good predictor of what they will actually do.40 
Regrettably, economic theorists of contract are not always as explicit about 
their theoretical goals as one might wish, and no doubt to a certain extent, law-
and-economics scholarship does seek to provide an external account of contract 
law. However, there is no reason to suppose that providing such external 
accounts is the dominant ambition for economic theories of contract law, 
particularly in light of the peripheral role of such claims in the law-and-
economics literature on contract law. In short, while economic theories can be 
understood as being normative or external, a large part of their appeal lies in the 
fact that they purport to offer an internal explanation of the law as we have it. 
That being the case, we can judge the success of economics as an internal 
account of contract law by the extent to which it explains current contract 
doctrine as resting on a set of economic justifications.41 This is ultimately 
something that it cannot do with regard to the law of contract damages. 
III. The Law of Contract Damages 
The basic rule in American law is that "[i]n awarding compensatory 
damages, the effort is made to put the injured party in as good a position as that 
in which he would have been put by full performance of the contract. "42 There 
is some dispute as to when this rule became entrenched. After the modification 
of the action of assumpsit in Slade's Case 43 made the common law courts into a 
workable forum for the resolution of contractual disputes, the amount of 
damages was left to the jury.44 Some historians claim that early juries awarded 
expectation damages, while other scholars suggest that the expectation measure 
became established later as judges limited juror discretion.45 As late as 1776, 
(discussing Friedman's methodological arguments). 
40. See Jody S. Kraus, Philosophy of Contract Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 687, 689 (2002) (arguing that efficiency theories are 
primarily concerned with predicting case outcomes). 
41. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 10, at 830 (documenting "the failures of economic 
models to explain [current] contract law"). 
42. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS§ 329 cmt. a (1932). 
43. See Slade's Case, (1602) 76 Eng. Rep. 1074, 1077-78 (K.B.)(modifying the action of 
assumpsit). 
44. See A.W.B. SIMPSON,AHISTORYOFTIIECOMMONLAWOFCONTRACT297-315 (1975) 
(discussing the importance of Slade's Case and the rise of the action of assumpsit). 
45. Compare IBBETSON, supra note 3, at213 ("Juries may ... have gone their own ways; 
but there is no good reason to believe that they did so .... "), with E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, 
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Chief Justice DeGrey doubted the expectation measure, saying, "I do not think 
that the purchaser can be entitled to any damages for the fancied goodness of 
the bargain, which he supposes he has lost. "46 Regardless, however, under 
modem law, the rule is that a disappointed promisee is entitled to damages that 
will put her in the position that she would have been in had the contract been 
performed.47 
This simple formula does not, of course, exhaust the issues involved. The 
first complicating rule is that "[ d]amages are not recoverable for loss that the 
party in breach did not have reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach 
when the contract was made. "48 This principle is most often associated with the 
case of Hadley v. Baxendale.49 There, a carrier breached its contract to deliver 
a mill shaft to a mill owner. 5° As a result, the mill stood idle for several days. 51 
The question was whether the owner could recover his lost profits from the 
days of idleness. 52 At trial, the jury apparently awarded damages for lost 
CONTRACTS 873 (1990) ("For roughly two centuries after the final extension of assumpsit in 
Slade's Case at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the common law courts paid little 
attention to this problem."); see also E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of 
Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1157-58 (1970) (arguing that juries had unconstrained 
control over damage measures for breach of contract until the nineteenth century); George T. 
Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law II: The Period Transitional to the Modem 
Law, 48 L.Q. REv. 90, l 08 (1932) ("In the early law the problem of compensation was treated 
as one of fact for the jury."). 
46. Flureau v. Thornhill, (1776) 96 Eng. Rep. 635, 635 (K.B.). 
4 7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 34 7 cmt. a (1981 )("Contract damages are 
ordinarily based on the injured party's expectation interest and are intended to give him the 
benefit of his bargain by awarding him a sum of money that will ... put him in as good a 
position as he would have been in had the contract been performed."); RESTATEMENT(FIRST) OF 
CONTRACTS § 329 cmt. a (1932) (same). My discussion focuses on the common law of 
contracts and hence does not include the law of sales, which is governed by Article 2 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). See generally U.C.C. § 2 (2003). Although the U.C.C. 
gives a disappointed promisee a variety of remedies in addition to money damages, when money 
damages are awarded under Article 2, the expectation measure is used. See, e.g., id. § 2-706(1) 
("[T]he seller may resell the goods concerned or the undelivered balance thereof. If the resale is 
made in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner the seller may recover the 
difference between the contract price and the resale price . . . less expenses saved in 
consequences of the buyer's breach."). 
48. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 351(1) (1981). 
49. See Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145,356 (Exch. Div.) (holding that 
"lost profits here cannot reasonably be considered such a consequence of the breach of contract 
as could have been fairly and reasonably contemplated by both the parties when they made the 
contract"); Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 
J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 251-54 (1975) (providing background information on Hadley). 
50. Hadley, 156 Eng. Rep. at 146. 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
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profits. 53 On appeal, the Court of Exchequer reversed and remanded for a new 
trial. 54 Baron Alderson summarized the rule to be applied: 
Where two parties have made a contract which one ofthem has broken, the 
damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of 
contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either 
arising naturally ... from such breach of contract itself, or such as may 
reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, 
at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. 
Now, if special circumstances under which the contract was actually made 
were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to 
both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, 
which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury 
which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special 
circumstances so known and communicated. 55 
The continued viability of this rule is demonstrated by frequent citation to the 
Hadley rule by modern courts. 56 
A second limitation on the expectation measure of damages is the so-
called "duty to mitigate. "57 The rule is nicely illustrated by the case of 
Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co. 58 A construction firm contracted with 
some county commissioners to construct a bridge. 59 After beginning 
performance and spending roughly $1,900, the county repudiated the contract. 60 
The firm, however, continued work on the bridge, ultimately spending more 
53. /d. at 147. 
54. /d. 
55. /d.at151. 
56. See, e.g., Rexnord Corp. v. DeWolffBoberg & Assocs., Inc., 286 F.3d 1001, 1004 
(7th Cir. 2002) (discussing the rule in Hadley); Bongam v. Action Toyota, Inc., 14 F. App'x. 
275,282 (4th Cir. 2001) (same); Draft Sys., Inc. v. RimarMfg., Inc., 524 F. Supp. 1049, 1052 
n.4 (E. D. Pa. 1981 )(mem.)(same); Marquette Cement Mfg. Co. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. 
Co., 281 F. Supp. 944,947 (E.D. Tenn. 1967) (same); In re Constr. Diversification, Inc., 36 
B.R. 434,438 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (same); Lawrence v. Will Darrah & Assocs. Inc., 516 
N.W.2d 43, 45 (Mich. 1994) (mem.) (same); Franklin Mfg. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 248 
N.W.2d 324, 325 (Minn. 1976) (same); Livermore Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Union Storage & 
Compress Co., 58 S.W. 270,273 (Tenn. 1900) (same). 
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 350(1) (1981) ("(D]amages are not 
recoverable for loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or 
humiliation."). 
58. See Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301, 307 (4th Cir. 1929) 
(finding that "the plaintiff must so far as he can without loss to himself, mitigate the damages 
caused by the defendant's wrongful act"). 
59. !d. at 302. 
60. !d. at 303. 
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than $18,000, and then sued the county for breach of contract. 61 Judge Parker 
wrote for the court: 
It is true that the county had no right to rescind the contract, and the notice 
given plaintiff amounted to a breach on its part; but, after plaintiff had 
received notice of the breach, it was its duty to do nothing to increase the 
damages flowing therefrom. 62 
Finally, there is the murky issue of reliance damages for breach of 
contract. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts suggests that an injured party 
has a right to reliance damages-in other words, a right to be put in the position 
she would have been in had the contract never been made.63 It is easy, 
however, to misunderstand the reach of this doctrine. In the 1930s, Lon Fuller 
and William Perdue published The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages.64 
The article set out clearly for the first time the distinction between expectation 
and reliance damages, capturing academic thinking on the question of damages 
ever since.65 Notwithstanding the influence ofFuller and Purdue, however, it 
would be a mistake to think of the reliance measure as a free-standing 
alternative to expectation damages. 
Generally, reliance damages are sought only when the plaintiff cannot 
show the value of her expectation or when the value of reliance exceeds the 
61. !d. 
62. !d. at 307. 
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 349 (1981) ("As an alternative to the 
[expectation measure of damages], the injured party has a right to damages based upon his 
reliance interest .... "). · 
64. See generally L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages (pts. l & 2), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 373 (1936-1937). 
65. See id. (pt. l) at 71-75 (distinguishing between the reliance and the expectation 
interest). The influence of Fuller and Perdue can plainly be seen in the evolution of the 
Restatement. Although Section 90 of the Restatement (First) famously acknowledged that 
reliance could give rise to an enforceable contract in the absence of consideration, when it came 
to damages there was no attempt to formulate reliance as an alternative measure of recovery. 
See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1932). In contrast, Section 344 of the 
Restatement (Second) explicitly adopts Fuller and Purdue's typology of expectation, reliance, 
and restitution interests in a doctrinally gratuitous section entitled "Purposes of Remedies." See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACT § 344 (1981). No other topic in the Restatement 
(Second) has a section that contains neither a rule nor a definition but merely sets forth the 
"purpose" of a particular area of contract law. Indeed, the idea of reliance so captured academic 
thinking about contracts that in the years immediately preceding the final promulgation ofthe 
Restatement (Second), Grant Gilmore famously suggested that reliance would ultimately 
undermine the whole of contract, which would simply become a species of tort. See generally 
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT ( 197 4 ). For a more philosophically sophisticated 
defense of the priority of reliance, see P .S. A TIY AH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 66 ( 1981 ). 
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value ofher expectation.66 For example, in anticipation of a huge demand for 
widgets, Jill contracts with Jack to build her a factory and purchases some of 
the materials that Jack will use. After starting work, Jack abandons the job, 
breaching the contract. However, by this time, the bottom has fallen out of the 
widget market, so that the value of a completed widget factory is zero. Jill sues 
Jack and seeks to recover her reliance damages (i.e., the amount that she spent 
on materials) rather than her expectation damages (i.e., zero). In such a 
situation, Jack can reduce Jill's damages by the amount that she saved as a 
result of his breach, which would include the full value of the additional 
materials that Jill would have had to purchase in order for Jack to complete the 
factory. 67 The functional result of this rule is that no award of reliance damages 
can exceed expectation damages. 
Additionally, while the Restatement (Second) suggests that reliance 
damages may be awarded when the enforceability of a contract depends on 
reasonable reliance rather than consideration, this seldom seems to happen in 
practice. 68 In actual fact, the courts tend to award expectation damages in such 
cases, using reliance damages only as a rebuttable surrogate for expectation 
when measuring its value is difficult.69 Hence, rather than providing an 
66. See Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest (pt. l ), supra note 64, at 73-80 
(distinguishing between the reliance and the expectation interests and questioning whether the 
expectation interest should set the limit of recovery). 
67. See RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 349 (1981) (stating that a disappointed 
promisee has a right to reliance damages "less any loss that the party in breach can prove with 
reasonable certainty the injured party would have suffered had the contract been performed"). 
68. See id. § 349 cmt. b ("[l]f a promise is enforceable because it has induced action or 
forbearance ... relief may be limited to damages measured by the extent of the promisee's 
reliance rather than by the terms of the promise."). 
69. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL Eouc. 518, 521 
(1996) (stating that the "much ballyhooed reliance revolution in contract law was not to be"); 
Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the 
"Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 903, 909 (1985) ("[R]eliance plays little role in the 
determination of remedies."); Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 
FoRDHAM L. REv. 303, 306 (1992) ("[D]amages are restricted to reliance recovery only in cases 
in which the expectation measure is not available for some reason."); Edward Yorio & Steve 
Thel, The Promissory Basis of Section 90, 101 Y ALEL.J. Ill, 130 (1991) ("Those rare instances 
in which courts award reliance damages involve either a problem with the promise or a 
difficulty in assessing expectation damages."). Some scholars, of course, have expressed 
skepticism about the results of these studies. See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Developments in 
Contract Law During the 1980's: The Top Ten, 41 CASEW. REs. L. REv. 203,212 (1990)("1f 
the prospective purchaser was successful in demonstrating promissory estoppel, the purchaser 
would be entitled to compensation in the amount of its reliance interest, but not its full 
expectation interest."); Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory 
Estoppel: An Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 CoLUM. L. REv. 580, 580 (1998) (arguing 
there is a "fundamental misunderstanding of how courts apply the theory of obligation called 
promissory estoppel"); Phuong N. Pham, Note, The Waning of Promissory Estoppel, 79 
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alternative measure of damages as such, in practice, a suit for "reliance 
damages" simply shifts the burden of showing the value of expectation 
damages from the plaintiff to the defendant. 
This summary of the law of contract damages suggests four basic features 
that economic theories must explain: first, the basic choice of expectation 
damages; second, the limitation of damages to those that are reasonably 
foreseeable; third, the duty to mitigate; and fourth, the burden shifting inherent 
in so-called "reliance" damages.70 
IV. Economic Accounts of Contract Damages 
Law-and-economics has apparently been quite successful in explaining the 
four basic features of contract damages identified in the previous section. The 
expectation measure can be explained by the theory of efficient breach. The 
rule of Hadley v. Baxendale can be explained as a penalty default rule. The 
duty to mitigate can be explained as creating an incentive to avoid wasteful 
CORNELL L. REv. 1263, 1263 (1994) (arguing that "reliance continues to exact an even greater 
influence on judicial application of promissory estoppel"). 
70. Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & Richard Crawell, Chapter on the Law & 
Economics of Contracts, in 1HE HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (forthcoming 2007) 
(manuscript at 97-98, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=907678) (providing an overview of 
default remedies and stating that each remedy can be adjusted depending on the behavior of the 
parties). There are, of course, other limitations on the award of expectation damages, and as we 
seek for finer-and-finer grained explanations of contract doctrine, these rules could be offered as 
further phenomena to be accounted for. I focus on the four principles above as the most 
important features of the current law of contract damages. For other limitations, see, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 352 (1981) ("Damages are not recoverable for loss 
beyond an amount that the evidence permits to be established with reasonable certainty .... "); 
id. § 353 ("Recovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded."); id. § 355 ("Punitive 
damages are not recoverable for a breach .... "). Economic theorists have offered explanations 
of some of these doctrines. See, e.g., Hermalin, Katz & Craswell, supra, at Ill (presenting an 
explanation for the "various legal and practical limits on contract damages"). One explanation 
states: 
[T]he non-breacher must prove the amount ofhis loss with "reasonable certainty"; 
often this will exclude recovery of "speculative" losses whose amount was 
uncertain. Also ... contract law only rarely allows compensation for emotional 
losses .... 
By reducing the effective amount of the remedy, doctrines such as these weaken 
many of the seller's incentives. . . . Of course, by shifting more of the loss to the 
buyer, the same doctrines may also strengthen the buyer's incentive to take carious 
precautions .... Finally, if buyers differ in the extent to which they suffer non-
recoverable losses, excluding those losses from the damage measure may reduce the 
cross-subsidization that could otherwise result. 
!d. at 112. 
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activity. Finally, so-called reliance damages improve the accuracy of 
determining expectation damages by aligning the informational needs of the 
court with the litigation incentives of the parties. 
The economic explanation of the expectation measure is one of the earliest 
and most enduring insights of the law-and-economics movement: the theory of 
efficient breach.71 This theory builds on Oliver Wendell Holmes's claim that 
"[t]he duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must 
pay damages if you do not keep it-and nothing else."72 Rather than forcing 
people to keep their contracts, the common law simply requires that they pay in 
order to breach them. 
After forming a contract, a promisor may find a higher value use for his 
performance than the one to which he is obligated under the contract. It is 
wasteful for the promisor to forgo this opportunity simply because of his 
commitment to the promisee. At the same time, merely opportunistic behavior 
can lead to social waste and inefficiency. The trick is to find a way of deterring 
not all breaches of contract but only those that are inefficient. This is exactly 
what the expectation measure accomplishes. By requiring any would-be 
breacher to pay the amount necessary to put the disappointed promisee in the 
position that she would have been in had the promisor performed, expectation 
damages guarantee that there will be no breach unless the benefit generated by 
the new use of the performance exceeds the benefit foregone by the promisee. 73 
Put in economic terms, expectation damages force the promisor to internalize 
the cost of his breach to the promisee, resulting in inefficient incentives. 74 
Economic theorists explain the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale in terms of 
incentives and information. 75 When parties enter a contract, they have 
71. See id at 99 (defining efficient breach as the circumstance where the breaching 
party's "gain[] from breach exceed both parties' losses"). 
72. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Dedication, The Path of the Law, 10 HAR.v. L. REv. 457,462 
(1897); see also POSNER, supra note 35, at 119 ("This dictum, though overbroad, contains an 
important economic insight. In many cases it is uneconomical to induce completion of 
performance of a contract after it has been broken."). 
73. See A. MITCHELLPOLINSKY,ANINrRODUCTIONTOLAW AND EcONOMICS 31-34(1989) 
(detailing why the expectation remedy leads to an efficient outcome in breach of contract cases). 
74. An alternative formulation is the claim that expectation damages provide a rule that 
mirrors that which the parties themselves would have chosen had they been able to fully specify 
their contract. See STEVEN SHA YELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 307 (2004) 
("[M]oderate damage measure lead to performance in circumstances resembling those ... under 
mutually beneficial completed specified contracts."). 
75. See Ian Ayers & Robert Gerner, Filling the Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An 
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, l 0 l-04 ( 1989) (discussing the holding in 
Hadley as a penalty default rule). The Ayers and Gerner theory of penalty default rules has 
recently been challenged as resting on flawed economic assumptions, and others have denied 
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imperfect information about the other party's situation, which can result in 
inefficiencies. For example, it is efficient for the promisor to take any 
precaution to avoid breach that costs less than the value of the promise to the 
promisee. At the time of contracting, however, the promisor may not know the 
value of the promise to the promisee. Indeed, during negotiations the promisee 
has incentives to conceal the true value ofthe potential promise in order to get a 
better price. As a result, the promisor may take inefficiently few precautions to 
avoid breach. By limiting the promisee's damages, however, to those that are 
reasonably foreseeable, the rule in Hadley creates incentives for parties to 
negotiate around this problem.76 Because the promisee cannot recover damages 
for losses that are invisible to the promisor at the time of formation, this rule 
gives the promisee an incentive to disclose this information when negotiating.77 
Once the hidden information is communicated, the promisor then has an 
incentive to take the efficient level of precaution to avoid breach because he 
will be liable for the full amount of the promisee's damages. 
The duty to mitigate damages also has an economic explanation. The law 
requires that disappointed promisees modify their post-breach behavior to limit 
promisors' damages.78 This rule, in turn, pushes resources to their highest 
value uses. Consider again the Luten Bridge case. 79 By continuing work, the 
contractor insured that those resources could not be invested elsewhere in the 
economy. His actions were wasteful precisely because the county was no 
longer a willing purchaser of his services and a willing purchaser could not do 
so because the contractor continued to invest in the bridge. By creating an 
incentive to find alternative purchasers of the rejected services, the duty to 
mitigate moves resources to higher-value uses. 80 
that Hadley v. Baxendale represents a default rule of any kind. See Eric Maskin, On the 
Rationale for Penalty Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 557, 557 (2006) (arguing that 
Ayers and Gerner's analysis is flawed); Eric Posner, There Are No Penalty Default Rules in 
Contract Law, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 563, 574-75 (2006) (arguing that Hadley is not a default 
rule). Ian Ayers has responded at length to both criticisms. See generally Ian Ayers, Ya-Huh: 
There Are and Should Be Penalty Defaults, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 589 (2006). 
76. See Ayers & Gerner, supra note 75, at 101-02 ("[S]o long as transaction costs are not 
prohibitive, a [promisee] with high consequential damages will gain from revealing [the] 
information and contracting for greater insurance from the [promisor] because the [promisor] is 
the least-cost avoider. "). 
77. See id. at 104 ("Hadley penalizes high-damage [promisees] for withholding 
information that would allow [promisors] to take efficient precautions."). 
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS§ 350(1) ("[D]amages are not recoverable 
for loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden, or humiliation."). 
79. See Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge Co., 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929) (finding 
that a plaintiff who received notice of breach has a duty to mitigate). 
80. See Hermalin, Katz & Craswell, supra note 70, at 104-05 (discussing the duty to 
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Finally, the law's treatment of reliance damages can be explained in 
economic terms. Rather than compensating promisees for their reliance per se, 
so-called reliance damages shift to promisors the burden of proving the value of 
the expectation damages in cases where expectation damages are much less 
than reliance damages. This is because plaintiffs have no incentive to ask for 
reliance damages in other cases. The upshot of this burden shifting is that the 
cost of proving the value of expectation damages rests with the party who 
stands to benefit the most from its accurate determination. Accordingly, that 
party has an incentive to bring evidence regarding the value of the expectation 
damages to the court's attention. This in tum reduces error costs associated 
with courts incorrectly determining the value of expectation damages. In short 
reliance damages align the litigation incentives of the parties with the 
informational needs of the court. 
V. The Problem of Bilateralism 
The arguments above seem to offer an elegant account of the key doctrines 
of the modem law of contract damages. 81 Upon closer examination, however, 
the economic arguments leave unexplained a fundamental feature of contract 
damages: The bilateralism of contractual liability. Bilateralism, in tum, causes 
the basic economic justification for expectation damages to come unraveled. 
A. Bilateralism and its (Mis-)Uses 
Bilateralism is such an obvious feature of civil liability that it has only 
recently acquired a name, but once focused upon, it has proven to be a fruitful 
topic. 82 Any private lawsuit brings together a plaintiff and a defendant. The 
plaintiff will offer reasons that the state should transfer some amount of wealth 
from the defendant to her. If the plaintiff is successful, then the court will 
award damages. The amount of money that the defendant will be forced to pay 
will be exactly equal to the amount of money that the court deems the plaintiff 
to be entitled to, and the defendant's payment will be made directly to the 
mitigate damages). 
81 See supra Part III (providing the basic formula for contract damages and several 
doctrines through which the damage award is limited). 
82. See generally Jules Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233 (1988) 
(reviewing WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 
(1987), and STEVEN SHA YELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987)). 
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plaintiff.83 Bilateralism is simply the most elegant term among some equally 
ugly competitors for naming this aspect of civil liability. 84 
Writing in the field of tort law, Jules Coleman has claimed that 
bilateralism is a basic feature of the field that any successful theory of tort law 
must account for. 85 He writes: 
Tort law's structural core is represented by case-by-case adjudication in 
which particular victims seek redress for certain losses from those whom 
they claim are responsible. In the event a victim's claim to recover is 
vindicated, her right to recover takes the form of a judgment against the 
defendant (a judgment which the defendant can discharge either directly or 
by some contractual relation, e.g. insurance) .... Any plausible account of 
tort law must explain why claims are taken up in this case-by-case 
fashion. 86 
Bilateralism, however, is a feature not only of tort law but of virtually all civil 
liability. Accordingly, the ability to explain this feature of the law can be used 
as a criterion not only of successful theories of tort law, but also successful 
theories of contract law. Critics of economics have invoked bilateralism to 
make two sorts of arguments. The first set of arguments claim that bilateralism 
commits the law to an ex post normative theory while economic theories 
necessarily rest on an ex ante perspective. 87 The second set of arguments is 
related to the first and claims that the bilateralism of civil liability means that 
the reasons judges give for their opinions are necessarily ex post and economic 
theories leave this judicial reasoning unexplained. 88 Neither of these criticisms 
is justified. 
The problem with the first argument is that it misunderstands the 
relationship between moral and legal reasoning. It is true that the bilateralism 
83. See id. at 1247-53 (discussing corrective justice and the economics of tort law). 
84. The other chief contender for the title is "correlativity," a term used by Ernest J. 
Weinrib. See WEINRIB, supra note 16, at 120 ("[C]orrelativity structures the nonnative content 
of corrective justice."). Some theorists have adopted Weinrib 's terminology. See, e.g., SMITH, 
supra note 10, at 148-49 (explaining the theory of correlativity and citing to Weinrib). I adopt 
Coleman's terminology for the good and sufficient reason that I am not entirely sure how to 
pronounce the word "correlativity," and I take it to have essentially the same meaning as 
"bilateralism." 
85. See JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST 
APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 16 (200 1) ("A plausible account [of tort law] must also explain the 
bilateral nature of litigation."). 
86. Id. 
87. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 134 ("[D]efenders of efficiency must offer an 
explanation as to why legal reasoning appears largely unconcerned with efficiency."). 
88. See id. at 132-33 (describing the ex post and ex ante debate in thecontextofcommon 
law adjudication). 
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of civil liability requires that plaintiffs and defendants be linked together on the 
basis of past conduct. 89 However, there is no reason that this link must itself be 
justified on the basis of an ex post moral theory. Consider, for example, a qui 
tam action.90 During the Civil War, the Lincoln Administration became 
concerned about the existence of widespread fraud in government contracting.91 
The federal government was dealing with suppliers on an unprecedented scale, 
and the opportunities for fraud massively exceeded the government's policing 
capacity.92 The result was the Civil False Claims Act of 1863.93 Under the 
Act, a party who became aware of fraud against the government could bring a 
suit against the defrauding party to recover money. Part of the judgment in the 
case would then be paid to the qui tam plaintiff and the remainder would go to 
the government.94 In its modern form,95 the False Claims Act continues to be a 
major source of civil litigation in the federal courts.96 
A suit between a qui tam plaintiff and a government contractor has a 
bilateral form. The plaintiff is claiming an entitlement to have money 
89. See Coleman, supra note 82, at 1233 (describing tort law as both "backward-looking 
and conservative"). 
90. See infra notes 91-100 and accompanying text (explaining the qui tam action and 
providing literary sources and statutory authority). 
91. See Dan L. Hargrove, Soldiers of Qui tam Fortune: Do Military Service Members 
Have Standing to File Qui tam Actions Under the False Claims Act?, 34 Pus. CONT. L.J. 45, 
54-57 (2004) (recounting the Civil War background of the original federal qui tam statute). 
92. See Patricia Meador & Elizabeth S. Warren, The False Claims Act: A Civil War Relic 
Evolves Into a Modern Weapon, 65 TENN. L. REv. 455, 458 (1998) ("The Civil War revived 
interest in the qui tam action due to the inability of the federal government to effectively police 
defense contractor fraud."). Qui tam is a shortened version ofthe Latin tag qui tam pro domino 
rege quam pro seipso, meaning "he who as much for the king as for himself." See Note, The 
History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 81, 83 (1972) (providing the 
translation and its historical relevance). Qui tam actions have a very long history in the 
common law stretching back into the late medieval period. See id. at 81-91 (providing the 
history of qui tam actions). Indeed, by expanding the jurisdiction of the royal courts they were 
one of the key weapons in the common law's long battle to supplant local, manorial law. See id. 
at 85 (stating that qui tam was one of the "[v]arious techniques [] devised to expand the 
jurisdiction of royal courts"). 
93. See Civil False Claims Act of 1863, ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696 (codified as amended at 31 
U.S.C. §§ 3729-3732 (2000)) ("An Act to prevent and punish Frauds upon the Government of 
the United States."). 
94. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2000) (providing the procedure by which qui tam recoveries 
are divided between the government and the qui tam plaintiff). 
95. See 31 U.S. C.§§ 3729-3732 (providing the law on false claims(§ 3729), civil actions 
for false claims (§ 3730), false claims procedure (§ 3731), and false claims jurisdiction 
(§ 3732)). 
96. See Meador & Warren, supra note 92, at 456 ("Due to its qui tam provisions, which 
allow private actors to act as attorneys general and pursue cases of alleged fraud, the [Federal 
False Claims] Act has become a favorite weapon in today's environment."). 
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transferred to her from the defendant. The existence of her entitlement will 
hinge on an evaluation of the defendant's past conduct.97 Furthermore, the 
plaintiff will have to make certain showings about herself to demonstrate that 
she is the one entitled to payment from the defendant. 98 Yet none of this 
ostensibly ex post reasoning rests on an ex post post-normative justification. 
Indeed, the reasons behind the qui tam statute are frankly forward looking. The 
goal of the law is to create ex ante incentives for private parties to investigate 
wrongdoing by government contractors and punish those that defraud the 
government. The bounty paid to the qui tam plaintiff is not compensatory in 
any way.99 Rather, qui tam actions allow the government to threaten its 
contractors with fines that deter them from future misconduct. 100 In short, there 
is no necessary connection between the ex ante arguments that justify the qui 
tam regime and the ex post concepts that allocate liability under that regime. 
The fact that the doctrinal concepts involved in qui tam adjudication are 
backward looking tells us nothing about the moral concepts involved in its 
normative justification. The qui tam example illustrates that there is no 
necessary connection between the ex post structure of civil litigation and the 
structure of the moral theories that justify any particular form of civil liability. 
Put in starker terms, ex post legal concepts do not imply ex post moral 
concepts. 
The second set of arguments based on bilateralism is related to the first. It 
goes like this: Judges justify their decisions in ex post terms, linking 
defendants and plaintiffs together with arguments about blame and fault rather 
97. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (setting forth the conditions under which a defendant can be 
liable under the Federal False Claims Act); see also United States ex rei. Crews v. NCS 
Healthcare of Ill., Inc., 460 F.3d 853, 855-56 (7th Cir. 2006) (same); United States ex rei. 
Vargas v. Lackmann Food Serv., Inc., No. 6:05-CV-712-0RL-19, 2006 WL 1460381, at *2-3 
(M.D. Fla. May 23, 2006) (same). 
98. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C. §§ 3730(b)-{c)(setting forth the conditions under which a private 
plaintiff may bring a qui tam action under the Federal False Claims Act); United States ex rei. 
Siller v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 21 F.3d 1339, 1355 (4th Cir. 1994) (setting forth the 
necessary showing for a successful qui tam plaintiff); United States ex rei. Fowler v. Caremark 
Rx, Inc., No. 03 C 8714,2006 WL 1519567, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2006) (same). 
99. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (setting forth the rules by which qui tam recoveries are 
divided between the government and the qui tam plaintiff). Although, admittedly, the portion of 
a qui tam judgment paid directly to the government could be justified as ex post compensation. 
100. See Hargrove, supra note 91, at 55 ("The need for qui tam action [in the Civil War] 
was predicated on the gravity ofthe consequences which resulted from unscrupulous contractors 
supplying inferior goods to the Union military when the Government's resources were too 
strapped by war effort to enable effective prosecution of these crimes." (internal quotations 
omitted)); see also United States ex rei. Hays v. Hoffman, 325 F.3d 982, 987 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(noting that the modern Federal False Claims Act is "intended to encourage private enforcement 
suits by legitimate whistleblowers"). 
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than arguments about incentives for future conduct. 101 Economics cannot offer 
an explanation of contract law because the reasons that judges offer for their 
decisions are part of the "law" that must be explained. 102 Legal reasoning, so 
the argument goes, purports to be "transparent," revealing its own normative 
basis. 103 Economic theories, in tum, deny this transparency. 104 The problem is 
that this objection overstates the place of judicial reasoning in pre-theoretic 
understandings of the common law. Non-economic theorists of the law-
including judges and lawyers-regularly speak as though the law consisted of 
"the holding" in a case rather than judicial reasoning or "dicta." 105 Indeed, if 
economists are to be cast from the temple of the law for their inattention to 
judicial reasoning, we must also cast out Holmes, Williston, and others, all of 
whom regarded case holdings rather than explicit judicial reasoning as the 
primary legal data. 106 Furthermore, this objection recapitulates the confusion of 
legal reasoning with moral reasoning. The fact that a judge uses ex post 
concepts to determine that a party has a particular legal entitlement need not 
imply that the law assigns the entitlement based on a commitment to a moral 
101. See Coleman, supra note 82, at 1241-42 (explaining how the "backward looking 
dimension of existing tort law limits the extent to which it can be used to pursue economic 
goals"). 
102. See id. at 1242 (stating that an "(e]conomic analysis can therefore only assume, but 
never explain, the structure of tort law"). 
103. See SMITH, supra note 10, at 134 ("[Do successfully explain a self-reflective human 
practice, such as the law, one of the things that must be explained is how that practice 
understands itself."). 
104. See id. at 132-36 (explaining the "transparency objection"). Smith writes: 
Law is comprised not just of rules and results in cases, but also reflects a 
characteristic form of reasoning, all of which must be accounted for by a complete 
theory. A theory that reveals legal reasoning as nothing more than meaningless 
rhetoric fails in this task. Instead of making legal reasoning intelligible, the theory 
leaves us with a mystery: [W]hy do judges and lawyers explain the law as they do 
if the real explanation is entirely different? Indeed, it is this discontinuity between 
legal and efficiency-based explanations that explains the hostility that many 
practicing lawyers and judges express towards efficiency theories of law. Legal 
actors are understandably uncomfortable with an explanation of the law that is so at 
odds with how they understand what they are doing. 
!d. at 134; see generally Patrick S. Atiyah, Executory Contracts, Expectation Damages, and the 
Economic Analysis of Contract, in ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 150, 150 (1986)( critiquing economic 
accounts of contract damages). 
105. See, e.g., Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375,379 (1994)("It is 
to the holdings of our cases, rather than their dicta, that we must attend .... "). 
106. See Jody S. Kraus, The Jurisprudential Origins of Contemporary Contract Theory 5 
(June 6, 2006) (unpublished working paper, on file with the Washington and Lee Review) 
(arguing "that the choice a theorist makes between the two views ofprecedential authority is 
likely to be influenced by the relative weight the theorist assigns to each of the two prongs of a 
conception of adjudicative legitimacy"). 
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theory with an ex post structure. Finally, contrary to the claims of the critics, 
judges-including judges who have not been infected by modern law-and-
economics scholarship-do use ex ante reasoning when explaining the basis of 
substantive legal rules rather that the legal entitlements of particular parties. 107 
Despite the fact that the most common arguments made against economic 
theories of contract on the basis of bilateralism should be rejected, bilateralism 
does pose a major challenge to economic explanations of the law of contract 
damages. The problem, however, is simpler and less "meta" than has generally 
been assumed. Even if bilateralism does not pose a deep normative challenge 
to economic theories, it does create major problems for the economic 
mechanics of those theories. 
B. Bilateralism as an Objection to Economic Explanations 
of Contract Damages 
Simply stated, bilateralism is a basic problem for the economic 
explanation of the expectation measure of damages, and without a justification 
for the basic choice of that measure, economic explanations of other aspects of 
contract damages are left without a necessary foundation. Furthermore, 
economic theories have generally taken the bilateralism of contract law for 
granted and have thus left it unexplained. 108 To be sure, one can justify a 
regime of contract damages on the basis of efficiency, but such a regime would 
look quite different than the one that the common law currently provides. 
Accordingly, economic theories standing alone fail to provide an explanation of 
current law. For such an explanation, we must look elsewhere. 
1. Efficient Breach and the Problem of Overreliance 
Economic problems with the theory of efficient breach have long been 
recognized. 109 What has not been clearly seen is the role of bilateralism in 
107. See Oman, Unity and Pluralism, supra note 11, at 1494-96 (arguing that judges rely 
on ex ante arguments when discussing normative foundations of the law). 
108. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of 
Precaution, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1, 5 (1985) (recognizing that damages will flow from the injurer to 
the victim). 
109. See, e.g., id. at 11-19 (arguing that the expectation measure provides an incentive to a 
promissee to over rely or rely on promises to a greater extent than is efficient); Aaron S. Edlin, 
Cadillac Contracts and Up-Front Payments: Efficient Investment Under Expectation Damages, 
12 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 98, 98 (1996) (discussing the phenomenon of expectation damages 
causing overinvestment); Aaron S. Edlin & Stefan Reichelstein, Holdups, Standard Breach 
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those problems. The most important economic objection to the theory is the 
problem of overreliance. 110 Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen summarized the 
economic paradox: 
( 1) In order for the promisor to internalize the benefits of precaution, he or 
she must pay full compensation to the promisee for breach. (2) In order for 
the promisee to internalize the costs of reliance, he or she must receive no 
compensation for breach. (3) In contract law, compensation paid by the 
promisor for breach equals compensation received by the promisee. 
Therefore, contract law cannot internalize costs for the promisor and the 
promisee as required for efficiency. 111 
The problem of overreliance can be illustrated with a simple example. 
Imagine that Jack promises to supply Jill with a widget-making machine, and 
Jill informs Jack that in reliance on the contract she will be purchasing a large 
supply of widget materials to manufacture widgets for the insatiable widget 
market. Jack then finds that Jane, who is a more efficient widget maker, will 
offer him an amount for the widget machine such that he can fully compensate 
Jill and still make a profit. True to the efficient breach theory, Jack reneges on 
his agreement, Jill sues to recover her expectation damages, and Jack pockets 
the difference between Jill's damages and the price paid by Jane for the widget-
making machine. Unfortunately, one problem mars this otherwise delightful 
picture of social efficiency: The effort and resources spent in procuring the 
unused bales of widget materials in Jill's warehouse are a waste. The problem 
is that once Jack and Jill have contracted, Jill has no incentive to consider the 
likelihood of Jack's performance. If Jack breaches, Jill will be fully 
compensated by the expectation damages. It would be more efficient, however, 
for Jill to consider the likelihood of Jack breaching, and structure her reliance 
accordingly. Simply stated, it is socially wasteful for promisees to act as 
Remedies, and Optimal Investment, 86 AM. EcoN. REv. 478, 487-91 (1996) (offering economic 
proof that expectation damages do not promote efficiency); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, 
Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. & EcoN. 691, 693 (1983) (arguing that without 
reliance, the rule oflaw produces damages that are not Pareto optimal); William P. Rogerson, 
Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 15 RAND J. EcoN. 39, 4 7-48 
(1984) (noting that expectation and reliance damages produce inefficient results); Steven 
Shaven, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 BELL J. EcoN. 466, 472 (1980) 
(discussing the problems of breach in reaching Pareto efficiency); Steven Shaven, The Design of 
Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q.J. ECON. 121, 124-27 (1984) (describing the 
relationship between efficient breach and the Pareto efficient production contract). 
110. See generally Shaven, Damage Measures, supra note 109 (explaining the problem of 
overreliance). 
111. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 233 (2d ed. 1997). 
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though their promisors' eyes will never stray to other opportunities after the 
contract is signed. 
In order to induce efficient reliance, we want a damage measure that 
gives promisees an incentive to consider the probability that promisors will 
not perform. For example, a restitution measure would restore to the 
promisee only what she gave the promisor in return for his now breached 
promise. In other words, the promisee would be protected against the sort of 
crass opportunism that would result if a promisor could take money in return 
for a promise that he never performed. Accordingly, restitution measures 
provide the basic trust necessary to induce parties to deal in the first place. 112 
However, the restitution measure gives the promisee absolutely no 
compensation for any expenses incurred in reliance on the promisor. 113 
Accordingly, the promisee will have every incentive to consider the 
probability of the promisor's breach when making her reliance decisions, thus 
avoiding inefficiently high levels of reliance. 114 
Law and economics theorists have long understood this problem and 
have put on as brave a face as possible. 115 A. Mitchell Polinsky has summed 
it up: 
[I]n general, there does not exist a breach of contract remedy that is 
efficient with respect to both the breach decision and the reliance 
decision. With respect to breach, the expectation remedy is ideal, 
whereas with respect to reliance, the restitution remedy is ideal. Thus, 
which remedy is best overall depends on whether the breach decision or 
the reliance decision is more important in terms of efficiency. 116 
What lies at the root of this problem is the bilateral structure of contract 
damages. By taking this structure for granted rather than recognizing it as an 
important phenomenon to be explained, however, the role of bilateralism in 
the problem of overreliance has been obscured. An examination of the 
economic responses to the problem of overreliance illustrates this. 
112. Cf COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS, supra note 15, at l 05-93 (arguing that contract 
law is justified by the need to provide "transaction resources" to encourage cooperation between 
strangers). 
113. See POLINSKY, supra note 73, at 38 ("[U]nlike under the reliance remedy, [the 
promisee] does not get his reliance investment back in the event of breach."). 
114. See id. (stating that the promisee "needs to know the probabilities of performance and 
breach" before spending more money in reliance). 
115. See generally Shavell, Damage Measures, supra note I 09 (setting forth the problem 
of overreliance). 
116. POLINSKY, supra note 73, at 38. 
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2. Alternatives and Explanations 
Those looking for an economic explanation of contract damages have 
responded to the problem of overreliance in basically two ways. First, they 
have sought to show that ultimately overreliance is not an important objection, 
because in actual fact it seldom occurs. 117 Second, they have suggested that on 
a more nuanced view of contract doctrine, current law avoids the problem of 
overreliance. 118 The first response concedes the problem but seeks to minimize 
it, while the second solution ultimately cannot be squared with current law and 
is best viewed as a normative critique of the common law of contracts rather 
than as an explanation of it. 
The most ambitious attempt to show that in practice overreliance is not a 
problem was offered by Melvin Eisenberg and Brett McDonnell. 119 According 
to them, in actual fact, various institutional features of contracting keep 
overreliance from occurring very much. 12° For example, certain kinds of 
reliance will occur if a party makes any preparations to perform a contract. 121 
This decision will be relatively insensitive to the availability or absence of 
expectation damages, particularly when the probability of breach is quite 
low. 122 They provide as compelling a case as can be made in the absence of 
real empirical evidence for the empirical irrelevance of efficient reliance. 
However, this response in effect concedes that a theory that could account for 
the bilateralism of contract damages would be a superior explanation to that 
offered by economics. They concede that overreliance is a possibility under the 
expectation measure, and a rule that could deliver efficient reliance while 
maintaining the efficient breach would be preferable. 123 
11 7. See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg & Brett H. McDonnell, Expectation Damages and the 
Theory of Overreliance, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1335, 1336 (2003) ("In most cases, overreliance 
normally cannot or is highly unlikely to occur."). 
118. See, e.g., id. at 1346 (arguing that in "most contracts cases ... overreliance normally 
cannot or is highly unlikely to occur[] because of institutional elements based on the economics 
of contracting and the way in which the standard expectation measure is actually administered"). 
119. See generally id. (rejecting the argument that the expectation measure causes the 
promisee to over rely). 
120. See id. at 1339-56 (arguing that institutional considerations cause the incidence of 
overreliance to be very low). 
121. See id. at 1342-44 (defining necessary reliance as the preparatory and performance 
costs that must be incurred over the contract is made). 
122. See id. at 1343-44 (explaining the inverse relationship between the probability of 
substantial performance and the expected cost of overreliance). 
123. See id. at 1357-73 (finding that the standard expectation measure does not guarantee 
reliance and proposing possible modifications to the standard expectation measure). 
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Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen claim to have discovered such a rule 
within the doctrine governing contract damages. They write: 
The paradox [of overreliance] has a solution. In fact, efficient incentives 
do not require internalization of total costs. Instead, efficient incentives 
require the internalization of marginal costs. Perfect expectation damages 
solve the paradox by setting damages so that the promisor bears the 
marginal benefits of precaution and the promisee bears the marginal cost of 
reliance. 124 
Unfortunately, despite their attempts to demonstrate the contrary, the common 
law of contracts does not adopt Cooter and Ulen's measure of "perfect 
expectation damages," and it is doubtful that it could. 
Cooter and Ulen's argument is ultimately quite simple. Their solution is 
to limit both the promisor's liability and the promisee's recovery according to 
an objective standard of efficient behavior. 125 Under these so-called "perfect 
expectation damages," the value of the promisee's expectation is not the 
difference between the profits that she did realize and the profits that she would 
have realized had the promise been performed given her actual level of 
reliance. Rather, the value of the promisee's expectation equals the difference 
between her profits given breach and the profits that she would have realized 
had the contract been performed in a world in which the she had the efficient 
level of reliance. 126 In other words, if the promisee engages in reliance that 
would increase her profits ex post in a world of performance but that are 
inefficient when discounted by the probability of breach ex ante, she receives 
no compensation for that reliance. At the same time, because the amount paid 
by the breaching promisor does include the profits that would have been made 
by the promisee had she efficiently relied, he has an incentive to consider those 
costs in his breach decision. Thus the Gordian Knot looks to have been cut. 
There are, however, at least two problems with this solution. First, it 
places huge demands on the ability of courts to gather and assess information. 
Second, despite Cooter and Ulen's argument to the contrary, current contract 
doctrine does not award "perfect expectation damages." 127 In order for Cooter 
124. COOTER& ULEN, supra note 111, at 233. 
125. See id. at 229 (" [W]e defined perfect expectation damages as enough money to restore 
the promisee to the position that he or she would have enjoyed if the promise had been kept and 
if reliance had been optimal."). 
126. See id. (stating that "perfect expectation damages" do not reflect "actual reliance" but 
"optimal reliance"). 
127. See Robert Cooter & Ariel Porat, Anti-Insurance, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 203,223 (2002) 
(stating that current contract doctrine only somewhat restrains reliance). They state: 
Contract law has not developed a burden of reasonable reliance. Rather, contract 
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and Ulen' s solution to work, the courts must determine ex post what the 
efficient level of reliance would have been ex ante. This is most likely beyond 
their capacity. First, determining efficient reliance requires knowing the 
relationship between the increase in the promisee's reliance and her payoff 
under the contract. 128 This marginal benefit would then have to be discounted 
by the ex ante probability of the promisor's breach so as to arrive at the 
efficient level of reliance where the discounted marginal benefit of reliance 
equals the actual cost of reliance. 129 Determining the ex ante probability of 
breach, however, involves the promisor's general trustworthiness, the 
availability of resources to invest in precautions, foreseeable ex ante 
opportunities for alternative deals, and-not least of all-his response to the 
threat damages that are a function of efficient reliance that is in tum a function 
of the probability of his breach. 13° Courts lack the ability to accurately 
determine most of these variables, to say nothing of their capacity to calculate 
correctly their interactions. 131 
!d. 
Jaw has developed the doctrine that plaintiffs are entitled to the foreseeable losses 
caused by breach. The burden of unforeseeable losses falls on the promisee unless 
he can shift them by giving notice to the promisor. This doctrine, which offers 
some restraint on reliance, stops far short of providing optimal incentives for 
reliance. 
128. See Eisenberg & McDonnell, supra note 117, at 1338 ("Under the standard 
calculation of expectation damages, a promisee will increase expenditures in reliance on a 
contract up to the point where the expected gain from an incremental increase in such 
expenditures equals the cost of the incremental increase."). 
129. See id. (stating that the probability of promisor's breach is usually not taken into 
account). The authors state: 
!d. 
In choosing the socially optimal amount of reliance on the contract, the promise ... 
should take [the] chance of non-performance into account. However, the standard 
expectation measure does not give the promisee an incentive to choose the socially 
optimal level of reliance. In particular, when calculating the expected gain from an 
increase in reliance expenditures, the promisee will not discount that expected gain 
by the probability that the promisor will breach. 
130. Mathematically, this means that either judges or juries would need to perform 
advanced calculus in order to calculate the proper level of damages, an implausible prospect to 
anyone who has ever spent much time with law students, lawyers, and judges most of whom are 
severely math-phobic. See, e.g., Myrna S. Raeder, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Unintended 
Consequences, and Evidentiary Policy: A Critique and a Rethinking of the Application of a 
Single Set of Evidence Rules to Civil and Criminal Cases, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 1585, 1590 
( 1998) ("Unquestionably, math phobia was the impetus for many of us to attend law school, 
rather than pursue other professions."). 
131. Cf Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial 
Error, 94 Nw. U. L. REv. 749, 754 (2000) (arguing that "courts are radically incompetent" to 
meet "the demands that are placed on them by relational contracts"). 
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Surprisingly, however, Cooter and Ulen claim that not only can courts 
perform such calculations but that they routinely do. 132 They write, "Various 
legal doctrines define overreliance. An important doctrine in the common law 
concerns foreseeability. . . . The famous case of Hadley v. Baxendale 
established the principle that overreliance is unforeseeable and, consequently, 
noncompensable." 133 This conclusion, however, rests on both an implausible 
reading of Hadley's facts and a misstatement of the rule in the case. In Hadley, 
the court concluded that the carrier did not reasonably foresee that the mill 
would close as a result of late delivery because most mills have replacement 
shafts. 134 This is a claim about what one could assume about the world in the 
absence of specific inquiry. In the hands of Cooter and Ulen, however, it is 
transformed into an economic conclusion about optimal levels of investment in 
mill shafts. 135 In order for the foreseeability doctrine to do the work of 
identifying efficient reliance, we must assume that the only foreseeable reliance 
is efficient reliance. In applying Hadley, however, courts have not looked to 
the economic wisdom of the promisee's reliance, but only to whether or not the 
behavior is foreseeable. 136 Indeed, by making promisors liable for specially 
communicated consequences of breach (including future reliance on the 
contract), courts hold promisors to what they actually know rather than what is 
economically efficient. 
The perfect expectation measure of damages, however, has a deeper 
problem from the point of view of interpretive theory. It allows the promisee to 
capture the equivalent of the profits from optimal reliance even though 
nonperformance of the contract means that these profits were never actually 
earned. 137 By its own terms, this transfer payment from promisor to promisee is 
not necessary to encourage optimal reliance by the promisee. 138 In order for the 
132. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 111, at 221-31 (presenting equations that account 
for all the variables that should be taken into account by the court when determining 
compensation). 
133. /d. at 231. 
134. Hadleyv. Baxendale, (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Exch. Div.). 
135. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 111, at 228-31 (basing the expectation award on 
optimal, rather than actual, reliance). 
136. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Principle ofHadley v. Baxendale, 80 CAL. L. REv. 
563, 567 ( 1992) ("[T]he principle of Hadley[] normally turns or should turn on some standard 
of foreseeability."). 
137. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 111, at 229 ("[P]erfect expectation damages equal 
the difference between [promisee]' s revenues when [promisor] performs and her revenues when 
he breaches."). 
138. See id. (stating that the expectation award does not vary depending on the promisee's 
actual reliance). 
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promisor to have the proper incentives, it is necessary for him to pay these "lost 
profits," 139 but the payment of this fine to the promisee is an economically 
pointless transfer. The "lost profits" paid by the promisor could be burned or 
thrown down a rat hole with precisely the same economic consequence. Fining 
the promisor for optimal reliance does have an economic rationale, but 
compensating the promisee for lost profits does not. In other words, even if 
perfect expectation damages could avoid the problem of overreliance, they 
cannot account for their own bilateral structure. 140 
One might argue that the bilateral structure of contractual liability can be 
thought of as a second-best response to the inadequacy our enforcement 
technology and defended as such on efficiency grounds. Rather than charging 
the state itself with an impossible task, enforcement is decentralized by giving 
aggrieved promisees a private cause of action. Allowing the plaintiff to benefit 
from the fine imposed on the defendant gives potential plaintiffs an incentive to 
press their grievances in court, thus policing the conduct of promisors. The 
problem with this response is that while it provides a completely plausible 
reason for dispersing enforcement, it still does not save economic theories from 
the basic contradiction between efficient breach and efficient reliance. This 
problem is compounded by the fact that there is no reason why enlisting private 
lawsuits to create the proper incentives necessarily implies the particular 
relational structure of liability that we see in contract law. For example, it 
seems possible to create a system of optimal contract enforcement based on the 
model of qui tam statutes. In a qui tam action, the successful plaintiff is 
essentially paid a bounty for bringing a lawsuit that, rather than righting a 
personal wrong, serves simply to enforce a public policy. 141 Likewise, one 
could argue that promisees in contract suits are simply acting as private 
attorneys general, seeking efficient levels of sanctions against breaching 
promisors. 
Economics, however, suggests that the amount of money that a plaintiff 
can recover bears no relationship to the magnitude-if any-of the plaintiff's 
139. See id at 228 ("[T]he efficiency of the promisor's incentives for precaution depend 
upon the level of damages."). 
140. Robert Cooter and Ariel Porat have made an analogous argument, noting that in many 
situations optimal incentives for both performance and reliance are best obtained by paying 
damages to a third party. Cooter & Porat, supra note 127, at 216-18. 
141. See Meador & Warren, supra note 92, at 459 (stating that a qui tam relator can bring 
on action on behalf of the government and receive a certain percentage of the damages and 
forfeitures). 
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loss. 142 Indeed, there is no requirement that the plaintiffbe harmed at all, 143 and 
most qui tam relators have suffered no personal loss at the hands of the 
defendant. 144 Rather, the amount of money that the plaintiff recovers should be 
set so as to maximize the government's goals-recovery of money defrauded 
d . d . . fi h 145 an mcrease mcentlves or onesty among government contractors -
considering the costs imposed by the payment to the plaintiff itself. Applied in 
the contract law context, this reasonably suggests that an optimal regime would 
be one where a defendant would be required to pay the full amount of the 
plaintiffs expectation but where the plaintiff would recoup only an amount 
sufficient to encourage the optimal level of lawsuits, which is presumably the 
level at which the marginal social cost of litigation (including the cost of 
inefficient reliance) is exactly equal to the marginal social benefit from more 
efficient incentives for the breach of contract. There seems to be no particular 
reason why this optimal level of reward for plaintiffs should correspond exactly 
to the optimal level of the fine imposed on defendants. 
3. The Economic Explanations that Remain 
The failure of the efficient breach theory, however, does not metastasize 
through economic arguments about other doctrinal aspects of contract damages. 
Consider the argument that Hadley is an information-eliciting default rule. 146 
Strictly speaking, the failure to account for the bilateralism of contractual 
liability and the economic incoherence of arguments for the expectation 
measure leaves the economic arguments in favoroftheHadleyrule unchanged. 
Whatever damage rule we adopt, we want promisors to consider the value of 
their performance to promisees, and we want promisees to disclose sufficient 
information for promisors to make that decision. By penalizing closed-mouth 
promisees with idiosyncratic consequential damages, we encourage disclosure 
of information that will increase the efficiency of contracting parties. 
142. See A Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives 
for Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. ECON. 562, 563 (1991) ("[T]he optimal award to the 
plaintiff may be less than or greater than the optimal payment by the defendant."). 
143. As shown by Cooter and Porat, optimal incentives may require payments to a third 
party. See generally Cooter & Porat, supra note 127. 
144. See Hargrove, supra note 91, at 51 (stating that a qui tam relator can obtain "a bounty 
for their information, even if they [have] not suffered an injury themselves"). 
145. See id. at 92 ("Congress's ultimate public policy goal in amending the [False Claims 
Act] in 1986 was to deter fraud and recover the Government's money."). 
146. See Hermalin, Katz, & Craswell, supra note 70, at 108-09 ("Under the rule of Hadley 
v. Baxendale ... a buyer facing large losses from breach is more likely to be allowed to recover 
those losses if she has told the seller about them in advance."). 
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The Hadley rule, however, can be applied regardless of the efficiency of 
the underlying damage rule. Hence, even if expectation damages are 
economically inefficient, the addition of the Hadley rule nevertheless 
increases the efficiency of the system. Likewise, requiring parties to mitigate 
their damages increases efficiency regardless of the underlying damage 
measure. Regardless of the efficiency of expectation damages, they are made 
less inefficient if we refuse to compensate promisees for avoidable post-
breach reliance on their promisors' promises. At the same time, both the 
Hadley rule and the duty to mitigate damages require that the law adopt some 
sort of a damages remedy. 147 While economic arguments in favor of these 
rules cannot account for the bilateralism of contract damages, once the rule 
governing those damages-whatever it is-is in place, the arguments can 
function. This does mean that despite their continued success, however, 
these economic arguments can do nothing to save a purely economic account 
of contract damages from the bilateralism critique. Without an argument for 
the bilateral structure of contractual liability and the basic choice of 
expectation damages, these admittedly successful theories are left hanging in 
mid-air without the support that they need to function. 
VI. Implications 
The critique of economic accounts of contract damages offered above is 
neither devastating nor trivial for economic explanations of contract law. 148 
The failure of efficiency theories to account for the bilateralism of contract 
damages leaves many of the insights of economics into the current structure 
of contract law untouched. It does mean, however, that an adequate theory of 
current contract law will require that efficiency be combined with an account 
of the bilateral structure of contractual liability. Autonomy theories provide 
such accounts and can be combined with efficiency arguments to provide a 
theory of contract that is at once pluralistic, principled, and explanatorily 
powerful. 
147. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 350(1) (1981) ("[D]amages are not 
recoverable for loss that the injured party could have avoided without undue risk, burden or 
humiliation."); Ayers & Gerner, supra note 75, at 101-04 (stating that the Hadley rule requires 
that the law adopt a damages remedy that correlates with the level of information the parties 
received). 
148. See supra Part V.B (presenting several contract doctrines and explaining why the 
doctrines provide objections to economic explanations of contract damages). 
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A. The Scope of the Critique 
The failure of economic explanations of contract damages can give rise to 
two possible responses. The first, to which ideological foes of law and 
economics are prone, is to cast economists from the temple of contract law 
theory. The second, to which practitioners oflaw and economics are prone, is 
to declare that the failure to explain contract doctrine is trivial and serious 
theorists have more important things to do. Both reactions are mistaken 
because they misunderstand what is at stake in creating an interpretive theory of 
a body oflaw. 
The goal of interpretive theories of the law is not to specify what an ideal 
body of law would look like. Rather, the goal is to render the law as it actually 
exists intelligible as a normative practice with a coherent normative logic. 149 
Economic theories of contract damages fail to render the common law of 
contract damages as it exists normatively coherent because they cannot account 
for the bilateral nature of those damages, and bilateralism, in turn, renders 
economic arguments for the expectation measure incoherent by tying both the 
promisor's and the promisee's incentives to a single measure. 150 The failure of 
economic theories, however, is explanatory, not normative. Their inability to 
account for contract damages does not mean that efficiency is a morally 
bankrupt normative guide. Furthermore, much of the economic theorizing 
about contract survives the problem of bilateralism. In short, the failure of the 
economic explanation of damages does not mean that it can be banished on 
either normative or explanatory grounds. It simply means that economics 
cannot operate as a solely sufficient explanation of contract law as it exists. 
A hard proponent of economic theories of contract might respond that the 
failure of economics as an interpretive theory is trivial. "So what?" such a 
thinker might respond. "The failure of economics to explain contract doctrine 
clearly doesn't vitiate efficiency as a normative criterion. That being the case, I 
can continue to theorize about contract law in purely normative terms. I simply 
don't need an interpretive theory of contract damages." 151 On one level, this 
response is entirely valid. There is nothing incoherent about imagining what an 
efficient contract law would look like regardless of the shape of the law that we 
149. See supra Part II (explaining the law through legal theories). 
150. See supra Part V (presenting the problem of bilateralism). 
151. Cf Richard Craswell, Expectation Damages and Contract Theory Revisited 55 
(Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 325, 2006), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=925980 ("In my own analysis of default rules, I am 
interested in the explicitly normative (or 'law reform') question of what the law ought to do 
with contract disputes."). 
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actually have. Such a project requires skill and intelligence and will likely 
yield important insights about the design of legal institutions. On the other 
hand, standing alone it cannot give us the resources to evaluate its own 
normative suggestions. 
First, we cannot make a decision about whether the law should be changed 
without knowing something about the value choices inherent in the law that we 
already have. We cannot know whether we should choose efficiency unless we 
know what it is replacing. In this sense, the final choice about legal design is 
normative, but it is comparatively so. In making suggestions for changing the 
law we are always dealing with an institution that is up and running, and 
deviations from past practice must be justified by showing the superiority of the 
new suggestions in relation to that practice. In short, a final judgment about 
normative theory requires that we engage in interpretive theory. Otherwise, we 
cannot know whether the new choices that we propose to make are superior to 
the choices reflected in the law that we have inherited. 
Second, depending on one's view ofthe institutional context in which 
normative legal choices are made, interpretive theory may become necessary. 
Legislatures are, of course, free to make changes in the law based on their 
views of what, all things considered, makes for the best legal policy. Contract 
law, however, is a common law field where most of the development of new 
law is left to judges. Hence, to a greater or lesser extent normative theorizing 
about contract law is addressed to common law judges. The extent and nature 
of legitimate innovation in common law judging is, of course, an enormously 
complicated question. 152 It is not one that I propose to tackle here. However, at 
least one plausible and widely accepted theory, that common law judges are 
bound to follow precedent and deviations from--or creative elaborations of-
old rules, must be justified in terms of the normative choices inherent in the law 
as a whole. 153 
There are, of course, alternative theories. For example, one view states 
that common law judges are free to act as interstitial legislators, adopting new 
rules on the basis of what they view-all things considered-to be the best 
152. See generally BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS ( 1921) 
(discussing the way judicial rulings are guided by information, precedent, custom, and standards 
of justice and morals); Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, in RONALD DwoRKIN, TAKING RJGHTS 
SERIOUSLY 81 (1977) (arguing that judges should look to moral philosophy when deciding 
cases); MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW (1988) (developing a 
coherent set of principles courts should use in establishing common law rules). 
153. Cf Dworkin, supra note 152, at 86 ("Lawyers believe that when judges make new 
Jaws their decisions are constrained by legal traditions but are nevertheless personal and 
original."). 
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policy. 154 It is not clear that the use of efficiency as a normative criterion 
necessarily commits one to any particular theory of adjudication. To the extent, 
however, that one addresses decisionmakers who believe that common law 
judges should decide cases in accordance with the choices inherent in the law, 
interpretive theory becomes necessary, and economic theorists cannot escape 
the necessity of understanding how their theories fit into the current structure of 
the law. 
Ultimately the real value in understanding the failure of economic 
explanations of contract damages lies not in justifying the rejection of 
economics per se, but rather in understanding the proper role of economics in 
contract theory. This is the topic to which I now tum. 
B. Toward a Pluralistic Theory of Contract 
Most of the debate between autonomy and efficiency theories has focused 
on the search for a conceptual silver bullet that will allow one side to declare 
victory. 155 Generally speaking, those with a vision of contract law having 
multiple normative goals have been anti-theoretical pragmatists who endorse a 
"good gray compromise of competing concems." 156 Very few scholars have 
focused their attention on the possibility of creating a principled but 
conceptually pluralistic theory of contract. Thinking through the implications 
of the failure of economic accounts of contract damages, however, shows us a 
very plausible structure for such a pluralistic theory. 
1. The Vertical Integration Strategy 
There are two basic strategies for resolving the conflict between autonomy 
theories and efficiency theories. 157 The first approach is to show that despite 
154. See generally RICHARD POSNER, PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990) (arguing that 
judges do not rely on logic or science, but an array of informal methods that are not dependent 
on legal training or experience). 
155. Compare BUCKLEY, supra note 36, at xi (stating that "[c]ontract law is best 
understood from the perspective oflaw-and-economics"), with FRIED, supra note 7, at 57 ("The 
moral force behind contract as promise is autonomy: [T]he parties are bound to their contract 
because they have chosen to be."). 
156. Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract 
Law, 47 WASH. & LEEL. REV. 697,701 n.14 (1990). 
157. See generally Kraus, Legal Theory, supra note 11 (stating that "autonomy theories 
tend to treat the doctrinal statement as the principal legal data . . . . In contrast, economic 
theories tend to treat the outcomes of cases as the principal legal data"). 
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the fact that both economic and autonomy theorists discuss "contract law," they 
are in fact constructing theories about different things. 158 Jody Kraus, for 
example, suggests that economists are largely concerned with case outcomes 
while autonomy theorists are concerned with legal reasoning. 159 The work of 
Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott provides another example. 160 They argue that 
autonomy theories of contract cannot be applied to contracts between 
corporations, which accordingly are the preserve of economic theories. 161 The 
second approach to reconciling autonomy and efficiency is the vertical 
integration strategy, which seeks to show that principles of autonomy and 
efficiency can be arranged hierarchically so that both can be deployed to 
explain and justify contract law. 162 
There are several different forms that a vertical integration strategy might 
take. First, one could argue that one value is foundational while the other value 
is derivative. For example, Daniel Farber has argued that while the law should 
primarily be concerned with personal autonomy, respect for such autonomy 
implies that efficiency is the sole goal of commercial law .163 In support of this 
claim, he offers an argument for why parties in a Rawlsian original position 
would choose a contract law specified solely according to economic 
158. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 541 & n.l (2003) (noting that efficiency theorists and 
autonomy theorists concentrate on different scopes of inquiry). 
159. See Kraus, supra note 40, at 689 (arguing that "autonomy theories tend to treat the 
doctrinal statements as the principal legal data for contract theory to explain" while "economic 
theories tend to treat outcomes of cases as the principal legal data for contract theory to 
explain"). 
160. See generally Schwartz & Scott, supra note 158 (discussing the types of contract law 
commercial parties would want the state to provide). 
161. See id. at 543 ("Normative theories that are grounded in a single norm ... have 
foundered over the heterogeneity of contractual contexts to which the theory is to apply."); see 
also Ethan J. Leib, On Collaboration, Organizations, and Conciliation in the General Theory of 
Contract, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 1, 2-9 (2005) (discussing the central importance of 
corporations for contract theory and lamenting the absence of more attention to the issue on the 
part of scholars). Elsewhere, I have criticized Schwartz and Scott's key philosophical claim 
(rather than their economic claims). See generally Oman, Corporations and Autonomy 
Theories, supra note 11 (arguing that autonomy theories can account for and justify the law 
governing contracts between corporations). 
162. See Kraus, Reconciling, supra note II, at 421 (stating that the vertical integration 
strategy "reconciles efficiency and autonomy contract theories by construing them as comprising 
legally distinct elements within one unified theory"). 
163. See Daniel A. Farber, Economic Efficiency and the Ex Ante Perspective, in THE 
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUND A TJONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 54, 56 (Jody S. Kraus & 
Steven D. Walt eds., 2000) ("My thesis is that critics were right about Posner's failure to 
establish economic efficiency as a universal, let alone supreme, moral norm."). 
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efficiency.164 The failure of economic accounts of contract damages discussed 
above, however, makes such a reconciliation difficult. 165 On one hand, 
efficiency cannot account for the bilateralism of contractual liability, which 
renders economic arguments for expectation damages incoherent. On the other 
hand, efficiency explanations of other aspects of contract damages, such as the 
rule in Hadley v. Baxendale, are quite successful. If, however, efficiency is 
derived from autonomy, (or vice versa), we would expect to see a law specified 
according to a single normative criterion. In contrast, the common law of 
contracts that we have has some areas that lend themselves to economic 
explanations and other doctrinal areas where this is not true. 
Another possible vertical integration strategy would be to arrange the two 
values in an explicitly normative hierarchy. For example, elsewhere I have 
suggested that " [ c )on tract law ought to be understood in terms of a two-tiered 
ordering of autonomy and efficiency. Both values ought to be pursued, but 
where they conflict, autonomy should act as a 'trump' value." 166 Yet the failure 
of economic accounts discussed above also throws this version of vertical 
integration into doubt. 167 Assume for a moment that autonomy theories 
provided a compelling reason for adopting the expectation measure of damages. 
The problem that such a vertical integration would immediately run into is the 
fact that while the law awards expectation damages, it also limits them, for 
example, through the duty to mitigate damages and the requirement that 
consequential damages be reasonably foreseeable. These rules, of course, have 
good economic explanations, but the fact that they exist suggests that in at least 
some cases of conflict, economic efficiency is being allowed to trump concerns 
about autonomy. 168 Yet contract law cannot rest on a normative hierarchy in 
164. See id. at 74--75 (hypothesizing a scenario in which parties would choose the 
Rawlsian approach). 
165. See supra Part V.B (presenting an objection to economic explanations of contract 
damages). 
166. Oman, Unity and Pluralism, supra note 11, at 1499. In support of this claim, I offer 
an argument for why parties in a Rawlsian original position would choose a contract law 
specified solely according to economic efficiency. See id. at 1500 ("[W]e seem to have at least 
an initially plausible reason for choosing efficiency in one sphere (those areas where liberty is 
not implicated) while placing emphasis on autonomy in another sphere (those areas where 
liberty conflicts with other concerns)."). 
16 7. See supra notes 165-66 and accompanying text (providing economic arguments that 
throw the first version of vertical integration into doubt). 
168. In Unity and Pluralism in Contract Law, I suggested: 
[L ]imitations on contractual freedom ... need to be justified in terms of preserving 
equal liberty [for all]. The priority of liberty does not mean that there are no 
restrictions on personal freedom. It simply means that those restrictions must be 
justified with reference to the concept of liberty rather than with reference to 
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which efficiency is allowed to consistently trump autonomy. 169 If this was the 
case, we would not have the current rule of expectation damages, as there are 
more economically efficient altematives. 170 
The final version of the vertical integration strategy sees the two values as 
operating so that one value authorizes the other value to proceed in the 
specification of rules within some limited domain. 171 The Rawlsian idea of the 
basic structure provides an example of such a conceptual relationship. 172 Rawls 
argues for the priority of justice as he defines it. 173 He does not, however, 
believe that all social relationships must pursue the principles of justice.174 
Rather, he says, these principles apply only to the basic structure of a society. 175 
Once that basic structure complies with the rules of justice, society is free to 
make choices that apparently conflict with the demands of justice.176 As Jody 
Kraus puts it: 
welfare, distributive justice, or some other value. 
Oman, supra note 11, at 1502. Assuming that autonomy theories imply expectation damages, 
one might be able to justify limitations on the full expectation measure by reference to the 
notion of autonomy itself To the extent, however, that such arguments cannot be made, I am 
forced to admit that the particular version of the vertical integration strategy that I endorsed 
previously must be modified. See id. at 1505-06 (presenting Unity and Pluralism in Contract 
Law as an example of the vertical integration strategy). 
169. Cf LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHA VELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE xvii (2002) ("Our 
thesis is that social decisions should be based exclusively on their effects on the welfare of 
individuals-and, accordingly, should not depend on notions of fairness, justice, or cognate 
concepts."). 
170. See supra Part V.B (presenting bilateralism as an objection to economic explanations 
of contract damages). 
171. See Kraus, Reconciling, supra note 11, at 423-29 (explaining how the vertical 
integration strategy can be used to reconcile normative and explanatory theories). 
172. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 6 (rev. ed., 1999) ("[T]he primary subject of 
justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social 
institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages 
from social cooperation."). 
173. See, e.g., id. at 4 7 5 ("The equal liberties can be denied only when it is necessary to 
change the quality of civilization so that in due course everyone can enjoy these freedoms."). 
174. See, e.g., id. ("The principles of justice for institutions must not be confused with the 
principles which apply to individuals and their actions in particular circumstances."). 
175. See, e.g., id. at 47 ("The primary subject of the principles of social justice is the basic 
structure of society, the arrangement of major social institutions into one scheme of 
cooperation."). 
176. See, e.g., id. at 7 ("There is no reason to suppose ahead of time that the principles 
satisfactory for the basic structure hold for all cases. These principles may not work for the 
rules and practices of private associations or for those ofless comprehensive social groups."); 
see also John Rawls, The Basic Structure as Subject, 14 AM. PHIL. Q. 159, 159 (1977)(defining 
the basic structure of society as the background social framework of the main social and 
political institutions). 
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[Q]uite apart from its substantive content, the form ofRawlsian institutional 
justification, which calls for a division oflabor between the basic and non-
basic structure of society, implies that the justification of these two kinds of 
analytically distinct but related structures within society must be provided 
by an overall theory com.flosed of analytically distinct, but therein unified, 
justificatory principles. 1 
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Likewise, one can argue that autonomy theories justify a law of contracts 
with a basic structure, namely one in which at least some voluntary obligations 
will be protected by a rule of providing compensation in the event ofbreach. In 
this way, the normative credentials of autonomy theory are brought to bear to 
justify the basic bilateral structure of contract law. However, once that basic 
structure is in place, efficiency-which has some normative force and 
considerable conceptual power-is used to specify additional rules. Such an 
approach to vertical integration provides a good account of what we see in the 
law of contract damages: A basic structure that cannot be defended on 
economic grounds, which is nevertheless encrusted with secondary rules that 
can be explained in economic terms. 
2. Bilateralism and Default Rules 
Autonomy theorists purport to be able to account for the bilateral structure 
of contractual liability and the basic choice of expectation damages. For 
example, Charles Fried, the most widely recognized contemporary defender of 
an autonomy theory of contract, has written: 
Ifl make a promise to you, I should do as I promise; and ifl fail to keep my 
promise, it is fair that I should be made to hand over the equivalent of the 
promised performance. In contract doctrine this proposition appears as the 
expectation measure of damages for breach. The expectation standard 
gives the victim of a breach no more or less than he would have had had 
there been no breach-in other words, he gets the benefit of his bargain. 178 
Notice that his argument has two claims. First, he explains why law links the 
promisor and the promisee together by civil liability, rather than adopting an 
insurance scheme or a rule punishing breaching promisors. The reason is that 
the promise itself creates a link between promisor and promisee so that 
entitlement flows from one to the other. 179 This is an explanation of 
177. Kraus, Reconciling, supra note 11, at 425. 
178. FRIED, supra note 7, at 17. 
179. While he does not explicitly discuss the issue ofbilateralism, Fried's discussion of the 
rules of offer and acceptance does provide an extensive discussion ofhow promising relates the 
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bilateralism. Second, he justifies the expectation measure by noting that it is 
fair to require one to hand over the equivalent of performance. Strictly 
speaking, it is not clear from Fried's analysis whether the fairness that demands 
one to render the equivalent is the same thing as the respect for autonomy in 
which he grounds the obligation of promising or some other value, such as 
corrective justice. Other promissory theorists, however, have argued that the 
expectation measure is logically entailed by the very idea of a binding promise. 
For example, David Friedmann has written: 
Suppose that in consideration of $300 D [the "Defendant"] undertook to 
transfer to P [the "Plaintiff"], within 6 months, certain shares. After 5 
months, when the price of the shares reaches $1000, D reneges. If we 
assume that the contract was valid so that it vested in P the right to the 
promised performance, it follows that P would be entitled either to specific 
performance (the value of which is $1 000) or to the substitutionary remedy 
of damages, which will be based upon the value of the promised 
performance, namely $1000 .... 
To claim that the contract is binding, i.e. that P was entitled to D's 
performance, and yet that the recovery can be confined toP's expenditure 
($300), is a contradiction in terms. 180 
One objection to this claim is the argument that respect for autonomy requires a 
remedy of specific performance. 181 After all, if we believe that people create 
promisor to the promisee via a binding obligation. /d. at 14 ("[P]romising is a way for me to 
bind myself to another so that the other may expect future performance .... "). He writes: 
The case of the vow shows that a promise is something essentially communicated to 
someone-to the promisee in the standard case .... A promise is relational; it 
invokes trust, and so its communication is essential. ... A promise cannot just be 
thrust on someone-he must in some sense be its beneficiary .... [Hence], we 
identify as a further necessary condition of promissory obligation that the promise 
be accepted. 
/d. at 42-43. 
180. David Friedmann, The Performance Interest in Contract Damages, Ill L.Q. REv. 
628, 637-38 (1995). Other theorists have offered analogous autonomy arguments in favor of 
the expectation measure. See generally Peter Benson, The Unity of Contract Law, in THE 
THEORY OF CONTRACT LAw: NEW ESSAYS 118 (Peter Benson ed., 200 l ); DORI KIMEL, FROM 
PROMISE TO CONTRACT: TOWARD A LIBERAL THEORY OF CONTRACT (2003); Randy Barnett, A 
Consent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 269 (1986); Peter Benson, Abstract Right and 
the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Contract 
Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 1077 (1989); Peter Benson, The Idea of a Public Basis of 
Justification for Contract, 33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 273 (1995); Dori Kimel, Remedial Rights and 
Substantive Rights in Contract Law, 8 LEGAL THEORY 313 (2002); Daniel Markovits, Contract 
and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417 (2004). 
181. See generally Randy Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. 
& PoL'Y 179 (1986) (arguing in favor of a default rule of specific performance based on an 
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obligations to act when they enter into valid contracts, why not force them to 
perform? The fact that specific performance is not the default remedy therefore 
suggests that autonomy theories do not account for the law of contract damages. 
Autonomy theories can meet this objection in two ways. 
First, one might argue that autonomy itself places limits on the sort of 
remedies that the law can impose. The basic intuition behind this argument is 
that specific performance represents a greater intrusion into personal freedom 
than do money damages, and so long as damages compensate the promisee for 
her loss, we ought to choose the remedy that intrudes on liberty the least. 182 
Applying this principle, for example, John Stuart Mill argued that "even 
without [a] voluntary release there are perhaps no contracts or engagements, 
except those that relate to money or money's worth, of which one can venture 
to say that there ought to be no liberty whatever of retraction." 183 A more 
elaborate version of this argument can be made using the concept of 
inalienability. There are certain kinds of rights, so the argument goes, that are 
neither morally nor practically alienable. For example, one cannot alienate the 
right to exercise independent moral judgment such that one could be relieved of 
all personal responsibility in choosing to obey an otherwise uncoerced 
command. Likewise, it is not possible-absent imaginary mind control 
machines-to alienate the ability to control one's body. These inalienable 
rights, in tum, track the category of obligations-personal service contracts-
for which specific performance is unavailable. 184 
A second response to the specific performance objection lies in the idea of 
private law itself. Aristotle identified corrective justice as a unique and 
independent normative principle based on what he called an arithmetic 
principle. 185 By this he meant that corrective justice was concerned not with 
the distribution of rights or the punishment of wrong doing, but only with the 
autonomy theory on contract) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
182. Cf Arthur v. Oakes, 63 F. 310, 318 (7th Cir. 1894)(holding that a decree of specific 
performance for breach of an employment contract would be involuntary servitude under the 
Thirteenth Amendment). 
183. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in THE ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 
949, 1031 (Edwin A. Burtt ed., 1939). 
184. See Barnett, supra note 181, at 180 (noting the court's reluctance to "specifically 
enforce contracts for personal services"). Note, however, that Barnett believes that while 
inalienability justifies the refusal to award specific performance for some contracts, he believes 
that the current defaults between damages and injunctions should be switched, so that specific 
performance is ordered unless some special showing is made. See id. (reforming the rules 
governing contract remedies). 
185. See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 125-28 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985) 
(presenting a concept of corrective justice). 
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compensation of those harmed by others. 186 Private law, one could argue, is the 
domain of corrective justice. 187 It is the set of institutions we have created to 
provide this particular sort of justice in our society. 188 It is this fact that 
accounts for the pervasiveness of bilateralism not only in contracts, but also in 
torts and property. 189 Corrective justice, however, does not specify the contours 
of the rights whose violation merits compensation. 190 It justifies a system of 
compensation, but leaves the substance of what is to be compensated to other 
values and principles. 191 This is the point at which autonomy enters the picture. 
Just as within the vertical integration strategy that I endorse above, the principle 
of autonomy creates a basic structure that then authorizes the pursuit of 
efficiency within the context of that basic structure, so autonomy finds itself 
nested within the principle of corrective justice just as contract law is nested 
within the private law as a whole. One of the advantages of this approach is 
that it explains the existence of bilateralism across the entire spectrum of the 
private law, a fact that becomes entirely-and implausibly-accidental if we 
assume that bilateralism in contract law rests entirely on principles unique to 
that body of law. 
Such autonomy arguments, however, proceed at a very high level of 
abstraction. Ultimately, they do little more than justify a legal regime that 
recognizes the obligation to keep at least some promises and the right to 
compensation roughly the equivalent in value of the promise. Autonomy 
theories do very little, however, to specify most of contract doctrine, including 
much of the doctrine governing damages. Richard Craswell, for example, has 
argued that promissory theories suffer from a fatal flaw, namely their inability 
to specify the content of default rules. 192 He suggests that although promissory 
theories may be useful for specifying rules of contract formation or 
186. See id. at 126 ("[Where] the action and the suffering are unequally divided [with 
profit for the offender and loss for the victim] ... the judge tries to restore the [profit and] loss 
to a position of equality, by subtraction from [the offender's] profit."). 
187. See generally WEINRIB, supra note 16 (arguing that private law can be understood as a 
single coherent normative institution structured around the idea of corrective justice). 
188. See id. at 19 (noting the "categorical difference between private law and other legal 
orderings"). 
189. See, e.g., Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law 
Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REv. 
287, 342 (2007) ("[B]ilateralism is an essential property of tort law."). 
190. Cf ARISTOTLE, supra note 185, at 126 (stating that "parties to a dispute resort to a 
judge, and an appeal to a judge is an appeal to what is just"). 
191. See id. at 126-27 ("[The parties] seek the judge as an intermediary ... assuming that 
if they are awarded an intermediate amount, the award will be just."). 
192. See Craswell, supra note 8, at 491 ("This frequently leads to careless or ad hoc 
statements concerning the proper content of contract law's background rules."). 
THE FAILURE OF ECONOMIC INTERPRETATIONS 871 
interpretation, they cannot be used to explain much of what we think of as 
contract law. 193 Since the publication of his article, autonomy theorists have 
provided a number of responses to Craswell' s criticisms, showing that their 
theories can explain more of the law of contracts than he supposed. 194 While 
many of these responses are persuasive, I believe that the fundamental thrust of 
Craswell's article remains sound: Autonomy theories simply cannot fully 
specify the content of contract law. Strangely enough, no one has taken up his 
suggestion to offer an account of contract law where both autonomy and 
efficiency peacefully coexist. This is not wholly surprising, of course. While 
Craswell admits that certain rules, which are derived from economic theories, 
can also be derived from promissory theories, other legal economists are not 
inclined to concede this contested ground. 195 For their part, autonomy theorists 
seem to have been content to fend off the charges of irrelevancy leveled against 
them by Craswell. 196 The failure of economic explanations of contract 
damages, however, suggests a structure for precisely the kind of pluralistic 
integration of contract theory that Craswell alluded to (but made no attempt to 
provide). 
Craswell's insight about default rules can be coupled with both the 
bilateralism-induced failure of economic accounts of expectation damages and 
the relatively abstract success of autonomy accounts of the expectation measure 
to provide a pluralistic theory. The autonomy theories provide a basic 
justification for the existence of contract law and its core remedial structure. 
This justification, in tum, then authorizes the use of efficiency to fill in the 
massive gaps that the indeterminacy of autonomy leaves. Furthermore, so long 
as the basic structure prescribed by autonomy theories--compensation for the 
lost value from breach of binding promises-remains in place, one may even 
limit or compromise expectation damages at the margins because such 
compromises do not undermine the basic structure of contract law. This, of 
193. See id. at 503-16 (explaining why the content of contract rules cannot be derived from 
such theories). 
194. See, e.g., Kraus, supra note 40, 689-90, 715-30 (explaining and weighing in on the 
dispute between Fried's autonomy theory and Craswell 's economic approach); Randy Barnett, 
The Sounds of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821, 826 
(1992) (showing how "the concept of default rules bolsters the theoretical importance of 
consent"). 
195. See Craswell, supra note 151, at 22 (conceding that autonomy theories are not 
"completely vacuous"). 
196. See, e.g., Charles Fried, The Convergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARv. L. 
REv. F. 1, 1 (2007) (stating that the argument "that contract doctrine is not and should not be 
rooted in the morality of promising, but rather in the economics of efficiency" is "frequently 
made but mistaken"). 
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course, is exactly what the law of contracts does. As discussed above, the 
extent of a promisee's compensable expectation is limited by various doctrines 
that are best explained in economic terms, even while the basic structure of 
expectation damages itself is best explained in terms of autonomy. 197 
While Craswell is ultimately interested in purely normative rather than 
interpretive theories of contract law, 198 he nevertheless would likely object to 
this proposed reconciliation for the simple reason that he does not believe that 
autonomy theories of contract can justify expectation remedies. 199 Craswell' s 
argument begins with the unobjectionable observation that parties could 
explicitly set forth a remedy in their contract itself.20° For example, a promisor 
might say, "I will deliver to you 500 widgets next week or else pay to you the 
market price of 500 widgets at that time." When the law provides expectation 
damages for breach of a promise that simply says, "I will deliver to you 500 
widgets next week," it is in effect supplying a default term. Taking Fried as his 
foil, Craswell writes: 
Fried's position was that the proper remedy for breach is to make the 
breacher hand over "the equivalent of the promised performance." But if, 
as I have argued, the equivalent ofthe promised performance itself depends 
on the full and exact scope of what was promised-including the exact 
scope of what was promised in the event of breach-then Fried's argument 
tells us nothing about the appropriate remedy until after we have already 
decided the exact scope of what was expressly or implicitly promised .... 
In short Fried's conclusion about what remedy should actually be awarded 
seems to require a rcrior decision as to what remedy was expressly or 
implicitly promised. 01 
The precise meaning ofCraswell's argument is unclear. There are at least two 
possible interpretations. One might interpret the argument as claiming that in 
the absence of an express agreement on remedy in the event of breach, we 
cannot know anything about a promise's value by recourse to its express 
provisions. In other words, if we have some background rule-say one in 
197. See supra Part III-IV (discussing doctrines governing contract damages and their 
economic explanation). 
198. See Craswell, supra note 151, at 52 ("In my own analysis of default rules, I am 
interested in the explicitly normative (or 'law reform') question of what the law ought to do 
with contract disputes."). 
199. See id. at 21 (claiming that "the selection of[ expectation damages] is not dictated, 
even presumptively, by anything in the entitlement theories"). 
200. See id. at 3 ("[D]efault rules are legal doctrines that govern the obligations of 
contracting parties only to the extent that the parties themselves have not provided otherwise in 
their contract."). 
201. !d. at 12. 
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which a promisor who breaches pays restitution damages-we can use that 
background rule to determine the real value of the promise, but in the absence 
of such a background rule we cannot determine a promise's value. The 
problem with this view is that it requires in effect that we treat promises made 
without either an express provision covering remedies for default or a 
background remedy rule as being worthless. As a conceptual matter, however, 
this is implausible. A promise involves at the very least a description of some 
action that the promisor commits to take in the future. We can determine the 
value of the promise by asking what the described behavior is worth. We look 
to the described behavior not because there is some promise-independent 
background rule requiring the expectation measure, but rather because we 
understand the promise as creating an obligation. In other words, we look to 
the value of the promised behavior because that is what the promisor ought to 
do. 
There is a second possible interpretation ofCraswell's argument, namely 
that while autonomy theories can justify expectation damages at some rather 
abstract level, they cannot generate all of the concrete rules necessary to 
translate the abstract commitment into something with the specificity of the 
contract doctrine governing damages. Such a claim, however, is entirely 
consistent with the vertical integration between autonomy and efficiency that I 
am proposing here. 202 Autonomy theories lack the conceptual power to specify 
most of contract law doctrine. Efficiency theories, on the other hand, cannot 
account for the basic bilateral structure of contractual liability.203 Indeed, 
Craswell concedes that "entitlement theories" (i.e. autonomy theories of 
contract that claim that legally enforceable promises give the promisee an 
entitlement to the value of the contract at the moment offormation) provide an 
adequate response to Fuller and Purdue's famous claim that expectation 
damages cannot be justified as a form of compensation.204 He writes: 
As a response to this argument, the entitlement theories ... work perfectly 
well. That is, if a contract has already transferred to the promisee an 
entitlement to expectation damages, then the promisor's failure to perform 
can easily be characterized as inflicting actual harm on the promisee just as 
theft inflicts a harm, by depriving the promisee of something that is 
rightfully his. Moreover, the remedy of expectation damages undoes that 
202. See supra Part VI.B.l (presenting the vertical integration strategy). 
203. See supra Part V.B (presenting bilateralism as an objection to economic explanations 
of contract damages). 
204. See Craswell, supra note 151, at 22-24 (presenting entitlement theories "as a response 
to Fuller [and] Perdue"). 
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harm by restoring to the promisee the exact value that he has wrongfully 
been deprived of.205 
Put in simpler terms, Craswell concedes that autonomy theories provide an 
explanation for the bilateral structure of contractual liability. Elsewhere 
Craswell suggests that autonomy theorists are "harken[ing] back to a pre-
modern, pre-realist, pre-Calabresi-and-Melamed approach to remedies."206 
Hence, he sees the claim that expectation damages compensate a promisee for 
the breach of her promisor as somehow obsolete or primitive. However, one 
could just as easily see the insight in logical rather than historical terms. The 
admittedly abstract claims of autonomy theorists are not outdated shibboleths 
from which modern thought has liberated us. Rather, they provide a 
justification for the basic bilateral structure of contract law-a structure that 
economic theories cannot adequately account for-that then serve as a 
framework authorizing and organizing doctrinal elaborations based on concerns 
for economic efficiency. On this view, autonomy accounts of contract damages 
are logically, rather than merely historically, prior to economic accounts of 
contract doctrine. Both accounts, however, are necessary to render the current 
law of contract damages coherent. 
VII. Conclusion 
The common law of contracts is an enormously complicated phenomenon. 
There is a more or less unbroken line of precedents stretching back well over 
400 years.207 Detailed contemporary treatises run into the dozens of 
volumes?08 Given this development and complexity, it is reasonable to suppose 
205. /d. at 23. Craswell, of course, asserts that this argument rests on the assumption that 
promisees become entitled to expectation damages, an assumption that he believes cannot be 
found in the idea of promising itself. See id. at 24-26 (responding to the historical association 
between expectation damages and freedom of contract). For my response to this argument, see 
supra Part VI .A. 
206. Craswell, supra note 151, at 20. The reference to "Calabresi-and-Melamed approach" 
is to the justly celebrated article on legal remedies by Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas 
Melamed. See generally Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability 
Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972). 
207. Roughly speaking, I date the rise of the common law of contracts to Slade's Case, 
(1602) 76 Eng. Rep. 1074 (K.B.), which cleared the way for the rise of the action of assumpsit. 
Of course, one can trace the law of contract back much farther than this. See IBBETSON, supra 
note 3, at 11 (beginning with medieval common law). 
208. The most recent edition of Corbin on Contracts runs to twenty-one volumes with 
supplements. See CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (Perillo ed., 1993 & Supp. 2007). Not to be outdone 
by his student even in his posthumous existence, Williston on Contracts comes in at no less than 
forty-two volumes once supplements, forms, and indexes are included. See WILLISTON ON 
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that no unifying theory of contract law is possible. On this view, contract doctrine 
represents little more than the random final product of a long chain of historical 
accidents. 209 Even if a perfect philosophical account of contract law is not 
possible, however, we may still hope for theories that render the bubbling, 
nominalistic mass of the law less confusing and more coherent than it appears in 
the absence of those theories. In the face of similar skepticism by the Legal 
Realists more than a half century ago, Benjamin Cardozo warned: 
The misleading cult that teaches that the remedy of our ills is to have the law 
give over, once and for all, the strivings of the centuries for a rational 
coherence, and sink back in utter weariness to a justice that is the flickering 
reflection of the impulse of the moment.210 
The failure of economic accounts of the law of contract damages, far from 
contributing to the "utter weariness" and "flickering ... impulse" that Cardozo 
feared, points toward a route by which "the strivings of the centuries for a rational 
coherence" may be carried forward.211 
Economics has proven to be a tremendously powerful way of looking at 
private law generally and contract law specifically. Although economic theories 
are seldom entirely clear about their own philosophical ambitions, they seek in 
part to provide an explanation of contract law as it currently exits, showing how 
the law embodies a set of coherent choices that create incentives for contracting 
parties to behave efficiently. One of the centerpieces of this explanatory ambition 
has been the attempt to explain the current law of contract damages in terms of 
efficiency. Ultimately, this attempt has failed because economics cannot account 
for the basic bilateral structure of contract damages. Bilateralism in tum, renders 
economic explanations of expectation damages incoherent. This failure, 
however, leaves untouched the successes of economics in explaining the ancillary 
doctrines of contract damages. Coupled with the failure of autonomy theories to 
explain most doctrinal detail, this suggests that contract law has a pluralistic 
normative structure where efficiency is subordinated to the concerns of autonomy 
in specifying the basic structure of contract law but is not banished from the realm 
of explaining the law that we have. 
CONTRACTS (4th ed. Richard A. Lorded., 1990 & Supp. 2007). 
209. Cf Peter Alces, The Moral Impossibility of Contract, 48 WM. &MARYL. REv. 1647, 
164 7-71 (2007) (arguing that the nature of contract doctrine precludes the construction of moral 
theories that explain or justify it). 
210. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 
45 COLUM. L. REv. l, 25 (1945). 
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